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On the Way to Grandmother's House: Is
U.S. Immigration Policy More Dangerous




When Little Red Riding Hood began her now infamous journey, she
stepped onto a well-marked path designed to take her straight to her
* loving (albeit ailing) grandmother's house and home again. Neither Red
Riding Hood nor her mother had any reason to fear that her outing would
be anything but a safe and uneventful jaunt to take her grandmother a
basket of goodies. Although the trip was unexpectedly marred by the
appearance of a duplicitous (and carnivorous) wolf, the trip was designed
to be unremarkable and rather ordinary. The journeys of unaccompanied
alien children through the "woods" to the United States, however, are
entirely different. Their paths are unmarked and wolves are the rule
rather than the exception. These children arrive in the United States
alone, without anyone to protect them, unable to speak English,
unfamiliar with the culture or the legal system, and fleeing hardships
severe enough to make them abandon everything they have ever known
for a new life. As daunting a prospect as that seems, every year
thousands of children' from other countries arrive in the United States
* Judicial Clerk for the Honorable Walter K. Stapleton, United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit; J.D. magna cum laude, Seton Hall University School of
Law; M.S. The Pennsylvania State University; B.A. The College of William and Mary. I
would like to thank Lori Nessel and Angela Lloyd for their flexibility and collegiality
during this article's initial development and for their thoughtful and insightful comments
on the original drafts. Additional thanks to Mark C. Alexander for taking time out of an
incredibly busy year to give transatlantic advice, support and encouragement. Finally,
immeasurable appreciation to my family and friends for their unwavering kindness and
patience.
1. For the purposes of this article, children, juveniles, and minors all refer to
persons under the age of eighteen
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
alone, afraid, and at the mercy of the United States government. Upon
their arrival, these children are often detained, sometimes for years,
while they await a determination of their immigration status.2 Some are
eventually removed from the country illegally. 3 Few receive the kind of
attention showered on five-year-old Elian Gonzalez upon his arrival in
the United States, following his rescue from the sea, after floating for
two days on inner tubes because the boat he was on sank.4 Elian's plight
captivated a nation,5 sparked a court battle,6 and raised important issues
2. For example, a young girl from India who arrived in the United States after
being sold by her parents to a stranger was detained by the INS for over a year in a
juvenile detention center before being granted asylum. Jacqueline Bhabha & Wendy
Young, Not Adults in Miniature: Unaccompanied Child Asylum Seekers and the New
U.S. Guidelines, 11 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 84, 84 (1999) [hereinafter Not Adults]
(describing the asylum hearing for the unnamed Indian girl). Huai Chun Zheng entered
the United States illegally in 1999 when he was just fifteen; he has been detained in
various jails ever since. See Julia Malone, Terror Bill May Curb Smuggled Kids,
ATLANTA JOURNAL & CONSTITUTION, Sept. 19, 2002, at 6A.
To get to the United States, fourteen-year-old Edwin walked or hitchhiked through
three countries, but, once he arrived, he was detained for nearly six months, housed with
violent criminals and beaten and pepper sprayed by guards. Immigrant Children
Protection Assistance: Hearing on S.121 Before the Senate Subcommittee on
Immigration, Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter Hearings]
(statement of Edwin Larios Munoz) (describing his journey to the United States and his
detention in numerous jails including one in which he was locked in a cell for eighteen
hours a day); see also David Oliver Relin, Who Will Stand Up For Them?, PARADE, Aug.
4, 2002 (noting that before he left Honduras, Edwin's father died, his mother abandoned
him and his cousin beat him if he failed to beg enough money every day); Beatriz
Terrazas, Uncertain Journey; but Some End up in INS Custody, Tangled in a Legal
System They Don't Understand, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 20, 2002, at 43A
(describing Edwin's experiences).
Fifteen-year-old Mekabou was held in an adult detention center for approximately
one and a half years before being granted asylum. See Women's Commission for
Refugee Women and Children, Prison Guard or Parent?: INS Treatment of
Unaccompanied Refugee Children, May 2002, at 16 [hereinafter Women's Commission]
("I was handcuffed, chained, and shackled like a criminal.... I felt like my life was
finished. I was too young to be there.").
3. Isau, a fourteen-year-old Honduran boy fled his native country to escape his
step-father's severe abuse and persecution from death squads and youth gangs. See
Women's Commission, supra note 2, at I (chronicling lsau's life in Honduras and
eventual escape). Isau was detained for two years before he was illegally deported back
to Honduras. Id. (noting that Isau was unlawfully deported while his appeal of his denial
of asylum was pending).
4. See 3 Who Survived Sinking Won't Be Deported, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1999, at
A] I (reporting that Elian and the adults on board were being smuggled into the United
States from Cuba; Elian's mother and stepfather died in the accident and their bodies
were never found).
5. For examples of the extensive media coverage given to Elian's situation, see
Future Unclear for Cuban Boy in Doomed Boat, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1999, at A21
(indicating that Elian's situation was sparking international interest); David Gonzalez,
Cuban Government Enters Fight For Boy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1999, at A16; Cuba
Impatient for Return of Rescued Boy, Castro Says, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1999; Sue Anne
Pressley, Young Refugee at Center of International Dispute, Father, Cuba Want Return
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regarding the status and treatment of refugee children entering the United
States alone.7 Yet, while thousands of children separated from their
parents, like Elian, arrive in the United States every year, few, if any,
receive meaningful legal protections. 8
This article addresses the need for greater legal protections for
unaccompanied alien minors who attempt to enter, or who enter, and
subsequently reside in the United States. Part II generally addresses the
problem of refugees worldwide and, more specifically, the plight of child
refugees. Part III examines U.S. immigration law as it pertains to
unaccompanied minors. Part VI examines the types of domestic relief
available to these separated children. Part V discusses how children are
treated pending a determination of immigration status. Part VI critiques
of Boy Rescued at Sea, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1999, at A03; Amid Cuban Protests, U.S.
Rejects Demand to Return Young Refugee, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 1999, at A20.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR"), noting the
disparity between the media frenzy surrounding Elian's case and that of other
unaccompanied children, commented that
[hiardly anyone blinked for instance, when 16 unaccompanied Afghan children
were found shivering among a cluster of adults trying to sneak across Austria's
eastern border shortly before Christmas... [o]r when a group of Somali
children landed at Zurich airport and asked for asylum.., or [when] a
Nicaraguan street child [was] granted asylum in Arizona, after having walked
thousands of miles alone to the United States.
UNHCR, Children: David vs. Goliath, available at http://www.unhcr.ch/children/david-
goliath01.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter David vs.
Goliath].
6. See Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338 (1 1th Cir. 2000); Gonzalez v. Reno, 86 F.
Supp. 2d 1167 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
7. See, e.g., Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr, What Little Elian Taught Us,
5 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 727 (Sept. 1, 2000) (noting that the court cases raised issues
of what types of assistance asylum seekers need, what role courts have in reviewing
agency decisions, and when a child is legally able to bring an asylum claim on his own
behalf); CNN.com, Elian Case has Potential to Alter Immigration Law, available at
http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/04/20/cuba.boy.ins.asylum/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2003) (on
file with author) (raising the possibility that "a decision on [Elian's] legal status in the
United States could rewrite U.S. immigration law" if the courts were to determine that a
six-year old could raise his/her own asylum claim); Siobhan Morrissey, The Next
Gideon?: Elian Rulings Could Usher in Free Legal Aid for Juvenile Asylum Seekers, 86
A.B.A. J. 26 (2000) (noting, optimistically, that some "advocates think the case may lead
to landmark law requiring free legal advice for juvenile refugees").
8. Over 5,000 unaccompanied minors are detained by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service ("INS") every year. United States Department of Justice, Fact
Sheet: INS' Office of Juvenile Affairs, available at http://www.ins.usdoj.gov (last visited
March 24, 2003) (on file with author) (providing statistics regarding "custody events"
involving juveniles for 1999, 2000 and 2001) [hereinafter Fact Sheet]. The absence of
legal safeguards for these children has gained greater attention since the resolution of the
Elian Gonzalez case. See Judges Are Told To Aid Children Who Immigrate To U.S.
Alone, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 2002, at A27 (discussing the president of the American Bar
Association's goal to encourage immigration judges to "take a more active role in
ensuring that children who arrive in the United States without any relative or guardian get
appropriate legal protection").
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the current U.S. immigration system, focusing on violations of and
ambiguities in domestic law, and suggests solutions to the current
shortcomings. More particularly, Part VI is an argument that the current
immigration regime violates constitutional due process, federal statutes,
and federal court decisions. To remedy these shortcomings, the United
States must provide unaccompanied juvenile aliens with counsel and
guardians ad litem from the moment they enter the immigration system,
and must be rigorous in complying with standards for the treatment of
these children while they await a decision on their immigration status.
Only by taking these steps can the federal government adequately protect
unaccompanied children's rights and fulfill its legal and ethical
obligations to this exceptionally powerless and vulnerable group.
II. The Plight of Refugees
Refugees are those persons who, because of "a well-founded fear of
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion, [are] outside the country of
[their] nationality, and [are] unable to or, owing to such fear [are]
unwilling to avail [themselves] of the protection of that country." 9 In the
past fifty years, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of
refugees worldwide. According to recent statistics from the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR"), ° there are
approximately twenty million "persons of concern" in the world today."
9. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951,
art. 1, 189 U.N.T.S. 150. The Convention limited the definition of refugee to those
persons who had become refugees "as a result of events occurring before" January 1,
1951." Id. The United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted by
the General Assembly in 1968 expanded the definition, removing the requirement that
refugee status be based on events occurring prior to 1951. United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art. 1, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
For a more detailed examination of refugee trends and statistics, see generally,
UNCHR, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2001 (2002) and UNHCR, Fact Sheet No. 20, Human
Rights and Refugees, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs2O.htm (last
visited March 24, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter Fact Sheet No. 20] (noting, for
example, that refugees in the 1950's were predominately European, individually fleeing
their countries of origin, yet today the majority of refugees are from Africa and Asia and
often are part of "mass exoduses rather than individual flights").
10. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was
established on December 14, 1950. UNHCR, Basic Facts, available at
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/basics (last visited Sept. 12, 2004) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Basic Facts]. UNHCR's mandate is to "lead and co-ordinate
international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide. Its
primary purpose is to safeguard the rights and well-being of refugees." Id.
11. Since 1993, UNHCR has tracked not only the numbers of refugees, but also the
number of "persons of concern." Statistics, supra note 9. This broader, more inclusive
category includes not only refugees, but also "asylum seekers ... returned refugees ...
internally displaced persons ... returned internally displaced persons" and stateless
[Vol. 109:2
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Of that twenty million, approximately twelve million are classified as
refugees. 12 Of that twelve million, half are children under the age of
eighteen, and of that group, nearly two million are under the age of
five. 13  These numbers illustrate that the international community is
facing a crisis in which children are being displaced, exploited,
impoverished, and physically and psychologically harmed in ways
almost impossible to imagine.14
Child refugees are the most vulnerable population under UNHCR's
mandate."5 Unaccompanied or separated children, because they are alone
or in the company of adults focused on exploiting them, are even more
vulnerable. 16 These children lack someone to speak for their interests, to
persons. Id. This expanded monitoring recognizes that persons who fail to fall within the
refugee definition may face many of the same hardships and may place many of the same
burdens on the international community as refugees, thus, placing them within the scope
of UNHCR's mandate. For example, internally displaced persons are "forced to flee their
homes but remain within the territory of their own country. Since they remain inside
their own countries, these persons are excluded from the present system of refugee
protection." Fact Sheet No. 20, supra note 9.
The broader "persons of concern" category also recognizes that it is becoming more
common that persons may be fleeing "natural and ecological disasters and extreme
poverty" and not just persecution based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular political group or political opinion. Id. Nearly one out of every 300 persons in
the world is a "person of concern." Statistics, supra note 9.
12. Statistics, supra note 9.
13. UNHCR, STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2001, supra note 9, at 13.
14. UNHCR notes that children "face numerous forms of persecution, such as child
labor, rape, female genital mutilation, forced military recruitment or [being forced to]
witness the torture or execution of parents and older siblings." David & Goliath, supra
note 5; see also Crystal J. Gates, Working Toward a Global Discourse on Children 's
Rights: The Problem of Unaccompanied Children and The International Response to
Their Plight, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 299, 300 (1999) (stating that the
"unaccompanied child asylum seekers or refugees generally suffer extreme psychological
trauma which requires counseling and other psychological services"); Lisa Rodriguez
Navarro, An Analysis of Treatment of Unaccompanied Immigrant and Refugee Children
in INS Detention and Other Forms of Institutionalized Custody, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L.
REV. 589, 590 (1998) (noting that "[d]ue to the conditions that refugee children have
already experienced in war-torn and ravaged home countries before arriving in the United
States, these children, more so than immigrant children, are at a greater risk of
psychological damage"); UNICEF, CHILDREN ARE OUR FUTURE: WORLD SUMMIT FOR
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 3 (1995) (describing the effects of war on children and noting that
"[c]hildren have been the most tragic casualties during the past decade, with more than
1.5 million killed, more than 4 million wounded or disabled, and some 12 million left
homeless").
15. Human Rights Watch, Promises Broken, available at http://www.hrw.org/
campaigns/crp/promises/refugees.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2004) (on file with author)
(noting that "[r]efugee children suffer a form of double jeopardy. A denial of their
human rights made them refugees in the first place; and as child refugees they are also
frequently abused, as the most vulnerable category of an already vulnerable population.")
[hereinafter Promises Broken].
16. See Promises Broken, supra note 15 (noting that these children first suffer abuse
that forces them to flee their country of origin, and then often "continue to suffer human
2004]
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negotiate the labyrinth of immigration law, and to ensure that they are
well cared for. 17 Unaccompanied children are defined by UNHCR as
children under eighteen years of age "who [have been] separated from
both parents and for whose care no person can be found who by law or
custom has primary responsibility."' 18  These children comprise
approximately 2% to 5% of the entire refugee population.' 9 UNHCR
indicates that in 1999 alone, over 20,000 separated children "applied for
asylum in western Europe, North America or Australia.,
20
Unaccompanied children may arrive alone because they "fled their
country without adults, were sent ahead by family members in the hope
that they would emigrate more safely, or became accidentally separated
from adults during flight."' 1 For many, hopes for better lives, stable
jobs, or protection from armed conflict or poverty underlie their
rights abuses in countries of asylum").
17. See Gates, supra note 14, at 317-18 (noting that unaccompanied minors likely
suffer from malnutrition, disease, exhaustion and that they are "generally abused and
exploited: some are 'passed from one family to another and others lack such basics as
food, clothing, shelter, medical care and education') (internal citation omitted).
18. Basic Facts, supra note 10. Both unaccompanied and separated children are
appropriate terms and will be used interchangeably in this article, even though there is
some concern that "unaccompanied children" fails to appropriately convey the dangers
facing children who arrive with smugglers or traffickers. See David vs. Goliath, supra
note 5; see also EVERETT M. RESSLER, NEIL BOOTHBY & DANIEL J. STEINBOCK,
UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN: CARE AND PROTECTION IN WARS, NATURAL DISASTERS, AND
REFUGEE MOVEMENTS 113 (1988) (noting that various terms have been used to describe
these children including "'abandoned children,' 'beggar children,' 'detached children,'
'foundlings,' 'homeless children,' 'orphans,' 'separated children,' 'street children,'
'vagabond children,' and 'waifs' and suggesting that "'unaccompanied child' is
preferable to the other terms because it avoids unsubstantiated implications about the
cause of separation or the existence or intent of the parents").
19. Basic Facts, supra note 10. UNHCR estimates that "at any one time there may
be up to 100,000 separated children in western Europe alone." UNHCR, The World of
Children at a Glance, available at http://www.unhcr.ch/children/glance.html (last visited
Sept. 12, 2004) (on file with author) [hereinafter World of Children]. In 2000,
approximately 16,100 unaccompanied minors applied for asylum in Europe-a number
which represented four percent of all asylum claims for that year. The Separated
Children in Europe Programme, Trends in Unaccompanied and Separated Children
Seeking Asylum in Europe: 2000, available at http://www.sce.gla.ac.uk/Global/
Documents/Eng/Statistics/Trends.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2004) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Trends]. The report highlights, however, the difficulty in ascertaining the
ages of applicants because not all countries keep or are willing to provide data on
unaccompanied minor's ages, the process of age identification is imprecise and countries
report their data in different formats. Id. The report does suggest that unaccompanied
minors are generally in their mid to late teens. Id. (noting that for the six countries that
provided data, the majority of unaccompanied minors seeking asylum were sixteen or
seventeen years old).
20. David vs. Goliath, supra note 5.
21. Michael A. Olivas, Unaccompanied Refugee Children: Detention, Due Process,
and Disgrace, 2 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 159, 160 (1990).
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journey. 22  In that respect, they are not that different from adult
refugees.23 Yet, children are "increasingly becoming the targets of
abuses directed at them because of their age," including "bonded labor,
child trafficking, child prostitution, sexual servitude, child pornography,
child marriages, life as street children, and female genital mutilation.,
2 4
As victims of these types of abuse, children are more likely to be
25
smuggled or trafficked into the country.
Because the United States fails to keep appropriately detailed
records of unaccompanied minors, little demographic information about
them is available.2 6 The Supreme Court's 1993 decision, Reno v.
22. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SLIPPING THROUGH THE CRACKS: UNACCOMPANIED
CHILDREN DETAINED BY THE U.S. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 1-2
(1997) [hereinafter SLIPPING THROUGH]; see also UJNHCR, Number of Unaccompanied
Children Seeking Asylum Steady Despite Wars and Forced Conscription, available at
http://www.unhcr.ch (Nov. 13, 2001) (on file with author).
23. See Women's Commission, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that "children often flee
their home countries for the same reasons as adults, including armed conflict and
political, religious, racial, and ethnic persecution").
24. Id. at 4.
25. Rosa Ehrenreich, Unaccompanied Children in IN.S. Detention, 5 GEO. J.
FIGHTING POVERTY 279, 280 (1998) (discussing the variety of ways that children arrive in
the United States alone); see also SLIPPING THROUGH, supra note 22, at 1-2.
26. See SLIPPING THROUGH, supra note 22, at 2 n.3 (noting that the authors of the
report "repeatedly asked the INS for up to date and comprehensive statistics on the
number of accompanied children apprehended annually, the number taken into custody
for less than seventy-two hours, and the ultimate disposition of all apprehended children,"
but were told that updated numbers were "[un]available because the INS does not keep
such records"). Recent testimony by Stuart Anderson, INS Executive Associate
Commissioner for Policy and Planning, before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Immigration did note that during FY 2001, there were "5,385 juveniles
in custody," however no other data was provided. Hearings, supra note 2 (statement of
Stuart Anderson, INS). Although very basic information is available through the Bureau
of Citizenship and Immigration Services (formerly INS), it fails to encompass the kind of
specificity and detail necessary to truly address the varying needs of unaccompanied
children and prevents any analysis of the outcomes for these children.
Congress explicitly addressed the need for accurate data regarding unaccompanied
minors in the recently passed Homeland Security Act of 2002 ("HSA"). See generally 6
U.S.C. § 279 (2003) (establishing the Directorate of Border and Transportation Security,
Citizenship and Immigration Services and giving authority to the Directorate to "establish
immigration services policies and priorities"). In transferring certain responsibilities for
unaccompanied children to the Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement of the
Department of Health and Human Services ("ORR"), the Act requires the Director to
"maintain[] statistical information and other data on unaccompanied alien children"
including
(i) biographical information, such as a child's name, gender, date of birth,
country of birth, and country of habitual residence; (ii) the date on which the
child came into Federal custody by reason of his or her immigrant status;
(iii) information relating to the child's placement, removal, or release from
each facility in which the child has resided; (iv) in any case in which the child
is placed in detention or released, an explanation relating to the detention or
release; and (v) the disposition of any actions in which the child is the
2004]
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Flores,27 however, provides frequently cited statistics. In Flores, the
Court noted that in 1990, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
("INS") 28 arrested nearly 8,500 children and approximately 70% of them
were unaccompanied.29 More recent sources state that, in the 2001 INS
fiscal year, 5,385 children were arrested by that agency; however, that
data fails to indicate how many of those children were unaccompanied.3 °
Incomplete data, however, is only one hurdle to gaining a full
understanding of the treatment and status of unaccompanied minors in
the United States. 31 A complex and murky history of both aliens' and
subject....
Id. at § 279(b)(1)(J). The Act also requires the Director to track actions taken by the
Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
State which relate to unaccompanied non-citizen children and to "conduct[]
investigations and inspections of facilities and other entities in which unaccompanied
alien children reside." Id. at § 279(b)(1)(L).
Problems with adequate data collection, however, are not limited to the United
States. See David vs. Goliath, supra note 5 (noting that although the INS does not keep
statistics on the numbers of unaccompanied children that arrive in the U.S. every year,
"[o]ther western governments are in a similar predicament").
27. 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
28. With the passage of the HSA in 2002, the INS was broken apart and its functions
distributed throughout the newly established Department of Homeland Security. See,
e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 271 (2003). INS functions are now predominately handled through the
Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services ("BCIS"). Id.; see also
http://www.immigration.gov (last visited Sept. 12, 2004) (discussing the reorganization).
However, for purposes of this article, where former decisions or actions were taken by
the INS, that label will be retained.
29. Flores, 507 U.S. at 295.
30. See supra note 26 (testimony of Stuart Anderson); see also U.S. Department of
Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Fact Sheet: INS' Office of Juvenile
Affairs, 8/01/02, available at http://www.immigration.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/
factsheets/OJA.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2004) (on file with author) (providing
information on "total juveniles in custody" from 1999-200 1).
The majority of children came from Honduras, El Salvador, Mexico, Guatemala and
China. U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Fact Sheet:
INS Office of Juvenile Affairs, 8/01/02, available at http://www.immigration.gov/
graphics/publicaffairs/factsheets/OJA.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2004) (providing a
breakdown of the top five countries from which alien children were arrested). However,
children also arrive from other countries, including Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Algeria,
Somalia, Colombia, and Sudan. Women's Commission, supra note 2, at 5.
This data fails to indicate if the numbers are referring to children arrested and
detained at the border, or picked up after residing in the country. The data also fails to
provide biographical data, to explicate where or for how long children are held, or to
explain why they were detained rather than released.
31. Other considerations that may hamper a clear picture of the problem include the
potential of misidentification of children as adults, the great likelihood that some children
are never apprehended and live outside of the INS's purview, and the fact that some data
may just be of poor quality or fail to appropriately breakdown demographic information.
Hostility towards detailed and clear data collection has been expressed by at least one
INS officer who noted that "we don't separately track juveniles and adults. It would
present tremendous data-gathering problems .... To us, a deportation is a
[Vol. 109:2
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children's rights, under U.S. law, makes any determination of the rights
of unaccompanied juveniles extraordinarily difficult to ascertain. The
following section first provides a brief overview of U.S. law as it pertains
to aliens and then to children, and concludes with a more specific
discussion of the treatment of unaccompanied alien children.
III. United States Law Pertaining to Aliens and Children
Unaccompanied alien children represent the intersection of three
groups that under U.S. law have historically been denied extensive
constitutional or statutory rights: aliens generally, aliens who have not
been lawfully admitted into the country, and children. Thus, determining
the rights of unaccompanied alien children under U.S. law is a complex
task requiring an examination of immigration law broadly, domestic law
as it pertains to children, and the intersection of the two. Immigration
law is a universe of dichotomies that distinguishes between substantive
and non-substantive immigration matters, between aliens and citizens,
and between admissible and inadmissible aliens, yet, with very few
exceptions, fails to distinguish between children and adults.32  In
contrast, domestic law historically makes clear demarcations between
adults and children, yet, that distinction has generally served either to
deny children rights entirely, to limit the scope of those rights when they
are granted, or to refuse to grant children standing to assert their rights,
placing them in the position of relying on adults to voice their rights for
them.33 Unaccompanied alien children, then "'fall into the no man's land
between U.S. immigration law and state child welfare law., 34 Therefore,
we cannot understand what rights these children have, or how those
rights are being violated, unless we examine both areas of the law.
deportation.... Also, where would you stop, once you start breaking the statistics into
categories? Someone might say, you should keep statistics on how many senior citizens
get deported." SLIPPING THROUGH, supra note 22, at 55 n.125 (interview with Elizabeth
Herskovitz, INS detention and deportation officer).
32. See David B. Thronson, Kids Will Be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of
Children's Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 990 (2002) (noting
that accompanied children are viewed as dependents of adults in the family context while
unaccompanied children are generally treated as adults and "subject to the same harsh
laws and procedural complexities"); see also Hearings, supra note 2 (statement of
Wendy Young) (calling the U.S. immigration system a "'one-size-fits-all' process
designed for adults that fails to take into account the unique needs of children").
33. See infra notes 46-63 and accompanying text. One judge noted that the
Immigration and Nationality Act "bears a 'striking resemblance [to] King Minos'
labyrinth in ancient Crete."' Perez-Funez v. INS, 619 F. Supp. 656, 662 n.11 (citing Lok
v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977).
34. Ellen J. Durkee, Special Problems of Custody for Unaccompanied Refugee
Children in the United States, in MICHIGAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
STUDIES, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES 197 (1982) (internal citation
omitted).
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A. Immigration Law
Power over immigration law in the United States is plenary and
resides with the executive and legislative branches.35 The law has
developed to encompass two separate traditions. The first is an
extraordinarily broad legislative and executive power in substantive
immigration matters-specifically, those determinations of what groups
may enter or may be expelled from the country.36 The second is a more
restrictive "alien protection tradition" which limits federal power and
affords greater rights to certain aliens in non-substantive immigration
matters.37
35. In early decisions deferring to the federal plenary power over immigration,
courts gave Congress and the executive branch "broad and often exclusive authority in
immigration matters." Hiroshi Motomura, The Curious Evolution of Immigration Law:
Procedural Surrogates for Substantive Constitutional Rights, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1625,
1626 (1992). The source of federal plenary power, however, has been inconsistently
identified by the Supreme Court. Compare Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884)
(upholding a federal immigration statute as a valid exercise of congressional commerce
power); with Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (deferring to
federal legislative enactments in immigration matters because the "power of exclusion of
foreigners [is] an incident of sovereignty"); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280
(1875) (invalidating a state immigration law because it allowed states to "embroil" the
United States "in disastrous quarrels with other nations").
36. See, e.g., Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606 (deferring to the executive and
legislative branches in immigration matters); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S.
698 (1893) (stating that the federal immigration power rests entirely in the executive and
legislative branches); Kleindeinst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (upholding the
exclusion of aliens based on their political beliefs because the right of the government to
exclude aliens is a matter of substantive immigration law); United States ex rel Mezei,
345 U.S. 206, 213 (1953) (finding that "whatever the procedure authorized by Congress
is, it is due process" for excludable aliens).
For a critique of this distinction, see Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United
States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV.
853, 862-63 (1987) (criticizing judicial deference in substantive immigration matters as a
product of "a racist, nativist mood a hundred years ago" which has "no foundation in
principle" and remains "a remnant of a prerights jurisprudence that we have proudly
rejected in other respects").
37. CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN, & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION
LAW AND PROCEDURE § 9.03 (2002). This shift, first recognized in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, is
founded on the recognition that aliens have rights protected by the Constitution; rights
that depend not on citizenship, but on an alien's connection to the United States. 118
U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (applying the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection clause to
aliens, finding that the clause applied, not only to citizens, but to "all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction"). Although Yick Wo dealt only tangentially with immigration
matters, its recognition of constitutional rights for aliens triggered the Court's broader
application of constitutional protections in immigration cases. See, e.g., Harisiades v.
Shaughnessey, 342 U.S. 580 (1952) (acknowledging that deportees have First
Amendment rights); Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896) (providing both
Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (finding that
undocumented alien children could not be excluded from public schools absent a showing
by the state of a substantial interest that would be furthered by the exclusion). In short,
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In addition to the distinction made between substantive and non-
substantive immigration decisions, immigration law has consistently
differentiated between aliens and citizens. Aliens have fewer
constitutional rights than citizens.38 Further, when certain groups of
aliens are afforded rights, the scope of that protection is often less
extensive than that given to citizens.39
Additional distinctions exist between aliens who have been lawfully
admitted into the country and those who have not. Historically,
classification of aliens was based on whether they had entered the
country or had been stopped at the border.40  Aliens were thus
"deportable" or "excludable." 41 Although the labels changed in 1996 so
the Constitution "meaningfully limits non-substantive immigration laws and does not
require special deference to the Government." Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d
681, 685 (2002).
38. For example, aliens may not vote. See U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV,
XXVI (referring only to citizens). Aliens may not be members of congress. See U.S.
CONST. Art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (requiring that members of the House of Representatives must be
citizens for at least seven years prior to their election); see also U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 3,
cl. 3 (requiring that members of the Senate must be citizens for at least nine years prior to
their election). In addition, the President of the United States must be a natural born
citizen. See U.S. CONST. Art. II, § 1, cl. 5.
39. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78-79 (1976) (noting that even when
aliens are protected by certain constitutional provisions, that fact
does not lead to the further conclusion that all aliens are entitled to enjoy all the
advantages of citizenship or, indeed, to the conclusion that all aliens must be
placed in a single homogeneous legal classification. For a host of
constitutional and statutory provisions rest on the premise that a legitimate
distinction between citizens and aliens may justify attributes and benefits for
one class not accorded to the other; and the class of aliens is itself a
heterogeneous multitude of persons with a wide-ranging variety of ties to this
country).
40. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 26-7 (3rd
ed. (2002) (discussing the distinction between "exclusion" and "deportation"). Non-
citizens who had entered the country were considered "persons" under the law when
determining constitutional rights. See Diaz, 426 U.S. at 78 (stating that "there are
literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States. The Fifth
Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons
from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law") (emphasis
added); see also Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 48-51 (1950); Wong Wing,
163 U.S. at 238; Russian Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931); Fong Yue
Ting, 149 U.S. at 739-40 (Brewer, J., dissenting) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment
applies to all "persons," not only "citizens"). Constitutional protection for deportable
aliens exists even when that presence is "unlawful, involuntary, or transitory." See Diaz,
426 U.S. at 77.
41. See LEGOMSKY, supra note 40, at 26, 630-838 (discussing the deportation
process). Aliens facing exclusion (refusal of admission) have consistently been afforded
fewer constitutional protections than deportable aliens. See, e.g., Mezei, 345 U.S. at 213
(limiting an excludable alien's due process to whatever is authorized by Congress);
Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (finding that "[w]hatever the procedure
authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned");
Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892) (noting that, in exclusion "the decisions
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that current U.S. law classifies both deportation and exclusion
proceedings as "removal proceedings," courts still rely on the historic
distinction between deportability and excludability to determine the
scope of an individual alien's rights.42
Finally, because the immigration regime is civil, not criminal, aliens
in removal proceedings cannot claim the same protections that exist in
the criminal context. Even though removal has been characterized as
"banishment" and "exile," the Supreme Court has consistently refused to
equate removal with criminal penalties or sanctions.43 In its 1999
decision, Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee,44 the
Supreme Court noted that aliens are not being punished by being
removed, and that criminal sanctions are available where punishment for
of executive or administrative officers, acting within power expressly conferred by
Congress, are due process of law").
42. This nomenclature changed in 1996 with the passage of the Illegal Immigration
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"). See 104 Pub. L. No. 104-208;
110 Stat. 3009; see also LEGOMSKY, supra note 40, at 27. IIRIRA classifies aliens not on
whether they have entered the country, but rather on whether they have been lawfully
admitted. See GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 37, § 9.04 (discussing the
changes and noting that IIRIRA amended the law by replacing "entry" with "admission"
such that admission is now defined as "the lawful entry of the alien in the United States
after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer") (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(13) (2003)).
Although the labels are different, there is no indication that the changes in language
have altered "the lines that the courts have drawn for constitutional purposes."
LEGOMSKY, supra note 40, at 27. Indeed, since 1996 several cases have relied on the
distinction to draw constitutional boundaries. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
693-94 (2001) (continuing to distinguish between deportable and excludable aliens by
noting that entry into the country provides aliens with due process protections even if
their entry is unlawful or temporary); Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 690-91 (discussing
at length the greater protections applicable to aliens who have entered the country
compared to aliens who have not entered).
43. Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947); see also Woodby v. INS,
385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966) (noting that deportation is a "drastic deprivation[]"); Bridges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154 (1945) ("that deportation is a penalty-at times a most serious
one-cannot be doubted"). But see Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm.,
525 U.S. 471, 491 (1999) (explicitly stating that "[w]hile the consequences of deportation
may assuredly be grave, they are not imposed as punishment"); see also Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U.S. 690, 730 (1893) at 730 (stating that "deportation is not
punishment for crime"). The AAADC Court noted that even in cases where
deportation is sought because of some act the alien has committed, in principle
the alien is not being punished for that act (criminal charges may be available
for that separate purpose) but is merely being held to the terms under which he
was admitted. And in all cases, deportation is necessary in order to bring to an
end [an ongoing violation of United States law.]
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491 (emphasis in original).
The AAADC Court did not address removal on the basis of inadmissibility, but arguably
the same line of reasoning applies, only in the exclusion context, where removal is
arguably sought to prevent a violation of United States law.
44. 525 U.S. 471 (1999).
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violation of a law is warranted.45
As a group, therefore, aliens in the United States receive far fewer
constitutional protections than citizens. Additionally, aliens who are
removable because they have not been lawfully admitted into the country
receive even fewer protections. As we will see in the following section,
when this consistent denial of rights and protections for aliens is coupled
with the longstanding denial of rights for children in the United States, it
quickly becomes apparent that unaccompanied alien children arriving at
our borders are likely to find themselves in extraordinary need of
appropriate legal assistance.
B. Domestic Law and Children
The phrase "children's rights" is something of an oxymoron in
United States jurisprudence. Legal discussions of children's issues often
center on whether children have rights of their own and, if they do,
whether they can assert them.46 Commentators note that court decisions
long treated children as little more than the property of their parents,
41making these children objects without independent rights of their own.
Although this stark denial of rights has gradually changed over time, in
some instances, children still are denied rights entirely. 48 In other areas,
45. Id. at 491.
46. See, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKiN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY, AND
STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW xxix (2000)
(characterizing the overarching concern of their book as being a discussion, not of
children's rights per se, but rather of "[wlho decides on behalf of the child"). Mnookin
and Weisberg also note that, especially for young children, the "relevant question often is
which adult should have the power to decide on behalf of the child," not what rights or
voice children themselves have. Id. at 3. The authors do note, however, that as children
age, the law begins to address "in what circumstances [it should] give children the power
to decide certain things for themselves and to be responsible for their own actions." Id.
47. See, e.g., Barbara B. Woodhouse, Who Owns the Child?: Meyer and Pierce and
the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 997 (1992) (discussing Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) as
being cases that "constitutionalized a narrow, tradition-bound vision of the child as
essentially private property"). Woodhouse notes, however, that a property model does
not necessarily assert that "children are property, but that our culture makes assumptions
about children deeply analogous to those it adopts in thinking about property." Id. at
1042. In speaking of parental property rights over children, Woodhouse describes
parents' control over children as being similar to the "bundle of rights" traditionally used
in discussions of control over property. Id. at 1045-46 (noting that in colonial America
parental rights included the right to use, transfer, and exclude children).
48. See, for example, in In re Gault, where the Supreme Court noted that
[iun practically all jurisdictions, there are rights granted to adults which are
withheld from juveniles.... In addition, it has been held that the juvenile is
not entitled to bail, to indictment by grand jury, to a public trial or to trial by
jury. It is frequent practice that rules governing the arrest and interrogation of
adults by the police are not observed in the case of juveniles.
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where children do have recognized rights, those rights are often far less
expansive than those afforded adults. 49  Even where children have
express rights, they generally do not have standing to assert them and
must rely on others to do so.
50
To a certain extent, limitations on children's rights are logical given
that "certain biological and economic realities" require that adults speak
for particularly young children who may not be able to understand the
issues at hand or the consequences of certain actions. 5' However, the
justifications given for denying a child a right entirely, or for denying
standing to assert a right, break down as children age and mature. As
one author has noted, "[t]hat an element of domination of children by
adults is inevitable gives no license to ignore the moral dimension" at the
core of the children's rights movement-that in some circumstances "the
law should give children the power to decide certain things for
themselves and to be responsible for their own actions.,
52
Although areas remain in which children do not have rights, in other
areas, courts recognize that children are entitled to constitutional
protections.53 For example, in Bellotti v. Baird,54 the Supreme Court
explicitly noted that "[a] child, merely on account of his minority, is not
beyond the protection of the Constitution.,
55 Similarly, in In re Gault,56
the Court expanded constitutional protections to children in delinquency
387 U.S. 1, 14 (1967); see also MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 46, at 2-3 (discussing
both statutory and constitutional provisions that preclude children's rights and noting that
"persons under certain ages cannot vote, hold public office, work in various occupations,
drive a car, buy liquor, or be sold certain kinds of reading material").
49. For example, in the school context children are consistently afforded lesser rights
than adults. See infra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
50. For example, in Pennsylvania, a minor may sue or be sued, but may not bring his
or her own legal action. See, e.g., Parks v. Parks, 135 A.2d 65, 67-74 (Pa. 1957); see also
Pa. R.C.P. Rule 2027 (2003) (stating that if a minor is a party to an action, a guardian
must be appointed to "supervise and control" the suit on behalf of the minor).
51. MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 46, at 3 (noting that the children's rights
movement cannot exactly parallel either the civil or women's rights movements because
at "the core of these other movements [] is the rather straightforward notion that a
person's legal autonomy should not be made dependent upon race or sex, at least without
some compelling justification" and that children are developmentally different than
adults).
52. MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note 46, at 3.
53. See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 47, at 1038-50 (discussing the history of
children as property and noting that "by the end of the nineteenth century ... children,
formerly private economic assets of parents, increasingly were viewed as individuals and
proper subject of public concern").
54. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (striking as unconstitutional a state law
that gave third parties veto power over a juvenile's decision to have an abortion).
55. Id. at 633.
56. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding that where a child faces a loss of liberty
he or she must be afforded appropriate due process protections, including the right to
counsel).
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proceedings, stating that "whatever may be their precise impact, neither
the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.,
57
The scope and extent of those rights, however, remains more limited than
rights of adults.58  In the Fourth Amendment context, for example,
although the Court recognizes that children have the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures, that right is differently defined than
that of adults.59
Limitations of children's rights and constitutional protections have
been justified in several ways. First, in delineating children's rights,
courts balance those rights against parents' rights to raise children and
the State's right to protect children. 60 In this balancing process, courts
57. Id. at 13.
58. For example, the Supreme Court has found that, although adults generally may
not be civilly committed unless they receive notice and an opportunity to be heard (a
hearing), parents may commit their children without the same protections. See Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602-03 (1979) (reasoning that parents always act in the best interests
of their children, thus children need not receive the same judicial protections of their
liberty interests). The Parham court noted, in a troublingly optimistic vein, that while
"some parents may at times be acting against the interests of their children ... creat[ing]
a basis for caution, [it] is hardly a reason to discard wholesale those pages of human
experience that teach that parents generally do act in the child's best interests." Id.
59. See Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls,
536 U.S. 822 (2002) (upholding suspicionless drug testing of students involved in any
extracurricular activities because students in public schools have a reduced expectation of
privacy and schools have a special need to ensure safety); see also Vemonia School Dist.
407J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (upholding suspicionless drug screens for students
participating in interscholastic athletics, noting that students have reduced privacy
interests, that the urinalysis was not overly intrusive and that the school district had a
"special need" to prevent and reduce drug use); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325 (1985) (allowing searches of students where there is an individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing where the search is "permissible in its scope" and where the "measures
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively
intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction").
60. The importance of parents' rights has been a consistent thread in constitutional
jurisprudence and those rights often explicitly or implicitly trump children's rights and
interests. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (invalidating on
substantive due process grounds a state law prohibiting the teaching of any language but
English in school because the law infringed upon parents' liberty interests which included
the right "to marry, establish a home and bring up children"); Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 746, 758 (1982) (prohibiting the government from terminating parental rights unless
it provided "clear and convincing evidence" that termination was necessary, because
termination infringes upon "natural parent's desire for and right to the companionship,
care, custody, and management of his or her children"); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (invalidating a state law requiring all children to attend public
because it failed to acknowledge that a "child is not a mere creature of the state; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for his additional obligations"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 214 (1972) (recognizing Amish parents' right not to send their adolescent children to
public school, despite the state's compulsory education law because the law too greatly
infringed on "the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of
their children"); Parham, 442 U.S. at 602-03 (finding that children's procedural due
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often narrowly define children's rights.6' Courts have also limited
children's rights by arguing that children are less capable than adults of
properly exercising rights and, as such, are in need of "protection" rather
than rights.62 Finally, even where children have recognized rights, they
generally do not have standing to bring lawsuits to assert them.63 Rather,
children must rely on adults, in either the private or public sectors, to
process rights are not violated when parents institutionalize them without a court hearing
because the Court assumed that parents are acting in their children's best interest).
Parents' rights, however, are not absolute and may be balanced against state
interests. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (upholding child
labor laws that infringed on parental rights to have a child solicit for Jehovah's Witnesses
as a part of their religious upbringing because "the family itself is not beyond regulation
in the public interest" and noting that the state may act to "guard the general interest in
the youth's well being ... [and] may restrict the parent's control by requiring school
attendance, regulation or prohibiting child's labor and in many other ways" in its role of
"parens patriae").
61. See Woodhouse, supra note 47, at 1001 (stating that "on the reverse side of the
coinage of family privacy and parental rights are the child's voicelessness,
objectification, and isolation from the community"). See, e.g., Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S.
253, 263 (1984) (discussing the scope and extent of due process for minors, noting while
it is clear that the protection exists, the more difficult question was how "to ascertain the
precise impact of the due process requirement") (internal citation omitted); Bellotti, 443
U.S. at 634 (justifying different constitutional protections for adults and children because
of "the peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an
informed, mature manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing");
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (balancing First Amendment exercise of
religion concerns with parental rights and the state's power to protect children);
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (balancing First Amendment free exercise
considerations with state and parental rights); see generally Gail Quick Goeke,
Substantive and Procedural Due Process for Unaccompanied Alien Juveniles, 60 Mo. L.
REV. 221 (1995) (discussing the scope of constitutional protections afforded children).
62. This approach in particular has garnered criticism. For example, the traditional
view of the development of juvenile courts is that they were created to protect children, to
exempt them from the harsh treatment of adult criminal courts and to swaddle children in
an informal setting designed to rehabilitate them. See MNOOKIN & WEISBERG, supra note
46, at 1227-1232 (citing The Invention of the Juvenile Court, in JUVENILE JUSTICE
PHILOSOPHY: READINGS, CASES AND COMMENTS 550-557 (Frederic L. Faust & Paul J.
Brantingham, eds., 1974). By adjudicating children in juvenile courts rather than
prosecuting them in adult criminal courts, proponents of the juvenile system argued that
children were being protected from the retributive and harsh sentences of the adult
criminal court and being granted a unique opportunity for rehabilitation. Id. Critics,
however, argue that juvenile courts were an outgrowth of "a steel fist of social control-
fired in a blast furnace of class conflict and women's liberation and tempered in the fluid
doctrines of positive criminology." Id. at 1229. Rather than a gentle, benignly
paternalistic adjudicative system, revisionists argue that the juvenile court "is no more
than the last in a series of institutions created by 19th century Americans to deal with
troubled and troublesome urban children." Id. For many years in these courts, children
were denied counsel and other procedural safeguards, and even today are afforded
counsel only in certain circumstances. See Mnookin & Weisberg, supra note 46, at 1143-
1154 (discussing status offense adjudications and how they differ from delinquency
proceedings).
63. See supra note 50.
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agree to handle their cases.
C. Unaccompanied Child Aliens: An Unenviable Hybrid
Unaccompanied alien children are in the unenviable position of
being both aliens and children-members of two groups that have
traditionally been denied constitutional and statutory rights entirely, or
granted them in only limited ways. Even more important than the
children's technical legal status, however, is the practical reality that
these children, arriving alone and afraid, with little, if any, knowledge of
English or the law, are in no position to understand or assert what rights
they may have, or to apply for relief for which they may be eligible.
Thus, understanding what happens to unaccompanied alien children
when they arrive in the United States involves an examination both of the
forms of relief available to these children and the treatment they receive
while seeking those forms of relief.
IV. Forms of Relief Available to Children
Because immigration law rarely distinguishes between children and
adults, the forms of relief available to children are, for the most part,
identical to those available to adults.64 Most separated children are
offered voluntary departure immediately upon being placed in custody.65
Those who refuse (or who are not offered departure) must seek other
forms of relief to avoid removal. Children may seek asylum, protection
under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"), or request one of three
types of visas, a "special immigrant" J visa, a T visa or a U visa.6 6
Although there are other forms of relief available to children, this article
focuses on the relief available to children arriving in the United States
64. David B. Thronson, Kids Will be Kids? Reconsidering Conceptions of
Children's Rights Underlying Immigration Law, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 979, 997, 1000-1003
(2002) (noting that immigration law generally treats unaccompanied minors "as adults by
default" and that immigration courts are neither designed nor equipped to handle
children).
65. "Voluntary departure is a procedure by which a qualifying alien may consent to
summary removal from the United States, normally at the alien's expense. For the INS to
implement this procedure, the alien must sign the voluntary departure form (form 1-274),
waiving the right to a deportation hearing and all alternative forms of relief." Perez-
Funez v. INS, 619 F. Supp. 656, 658 (1985); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1229(c) (2003)
(providing the statutory grounds for voluntary departure). There is an exception to the
requirement that an alien pay the costs of removal. See 8 U.S.C. §1231 (2003) (noting
that if an alien is "financially unable to depart at the alien's own expense and whose
removal the Attorney General deems to be in the best interest of the United States, the
expense of such removal may be paid from the appropriation for the enforcement of this
Act"). See infra Part IV.A. for a discussion of how voluntary departure pertains to
unaccompanied children more directly.
66. See infra Parts.IV.D & IV.E.
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after fleeing some type of persecution, severe abuse, or neglect. 67 Thus,
this article does not address relief for children who arrive to join family
members who are U.S. citizens or legal residents.68
A. Voluntary Departure
Voluntary departure is a means by which a qualifying alien may
agree to leave the country "voluntarily" and, therefore, avoid being
formally removed.69 Avoiding a formal removal order may be beneficial
because it precludes the imposition of a bar to the alien's return to the
United States.70 Aliens arrested by the INS are "almost always offered
the choice of departing the country voluntarily" and up to "98% of them
take that course., 7 1 There are, however, some procedural protections
afforded juveniles before they are allowed to accept voluntary departure.
67. This article does not, however, address "temporary protected status" ("TPS")
which allows aliens to remain in the United States if Congress has declared that their
country of nationality or last residence is temporarily dangerous or unstable. See 8
U.S.C. § 1254a (2003) (permitting the Attorney General to grant TPS for aliens whose
country of origin or last residence (1) is involved in an "ongoing armed conflict within
the state" of such magnitude that returning aliens to that country would "pose a serious
threat to their personal safety," (2) has experienced an natural disaster that results in a
"substantial, but temporary, disruption of living conditions in the area affected,"
(3) temporarily cannot handle an influx of aliens "who are nationals of the state." 8
U.S.C. § 1254a(b). The Attorney General may also grant TPS where "extraordinary and
temporary conditions in the foreign state ... prevent nationals who are aliens of the state
from returning in safety" unless "permitting the aliens to remain in the United States is
contrary to the national interest of the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(C)).
68. Family based immigration is covered under 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (2003) (family-
sponsored immigrants) and 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (2003) (worldwide level of immigration of
children, spouses, and parents of U.S. citizens).
69. See 8 C.F.R. § 240.25 (2003) (noting that 8 U.S.C. § 1229(c) allows aliens to
choose voluntary departure "in lieu of being subject" to removal proceedings); see also
STEVEN H. LEGOMSKY, supra note 40, at 616 (discussing voluntary departure generally).
70. If an alien has been previously removed and attempts to re-enter the United
States, he or she is barred from doing so for a certain number of years. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1 182(a)(9)(A) (2003) (indicating that an alien who is excluded is barred from returning
for five years and an alien who is deported is barred from returning for ten years). A
second removal order (based on either exclusion or deportation) triggers a twenty year
bar. Id. § 1182(a)(9)(A).
71. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 307 (1993) (discussing voluntary departure
generally); see also INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1044 (1984) (noting that
approximately 97.5% of aliens offered voluntary departure accept it); Irene Scharf &
Christine Hess, What Process is Due? Unaccompanied Minors' Rights to Deportation
Hearings, 1988 DuKE L.J. 114, 115 (1988) (noting that in the San Diego area alone, from
July through September 1987, 2190 unaccompanied alien children were apprehended by
the INS and 85.3% of them took voluntary departure). The most recent statistics indicate
that in 1999, 1,200 children voluntarily departed from the United States. Morrissey,
supra note 7 (quoting Bernard Perlmutter, director of the University of Miami's Children
and Youth Clinic as suggesting that many of them may not have fully understood their
rights).
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First, juveniles from Mexico or Canada caught at the border, "shall be
informed, prior to presentation of the voluntary departure form or being
allowed to withdraw his or her application for admission, that he or she
may make a telephone call to a parent, close relative, a friend or to an
organization found on the free legal services list. '72 The INS regulations
do not, however, require that the juvenile actually make the call.7 3 All
other juveniles must be given access to a telephone and "must in fact
communicate with either a parent, adult relative, friend or with an
organization found on the free legal services list prior to presentation of
the voluntary departure form. 74  Although voluntary departure is
supposed to be an option available to all aliens, a class action brought in
federal district court in California highlights the unique problems facing
unaccompanied children who are taken into custody by the INS.
1. Perez-Funez v. INS
In 1985, a class action was brought against the INS in the United
States District Court for the Central District of California alleging that
INS voluntary departure procedures for unaccompanied alien children
violated those children's Fifth Amendment due process rights.75 The
class in Perez-Funez v. INS76 was defined as:
[A]ll persons who appear, are known, or claim to be under the age of
eighteen years who are now or in the future taken into or held in
custody in the United States by agents of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service for possible deportation from the United
States, and who are not accompanied by at least one of their natural
or lawful parents at the time of being taken or received in custody
within the United States.
77
The class representative was a sixteen-year-old boy who was
arrested in California near the Mexican border on March 22, 1981.71
Perez-Funez claimed that the INS pressured him to sign voluntary
72. 8 C.F.R. § 236.3(g) (2004).
73. See id.; see also Flores, 507 U.S. at 307 n.4 (noting that the call is not mandatory
because the United States has "treaty obligations to notify diplomatic or consular officers
of those countries whenever their nationals are detained").
74. 8 C.F.R. § 236.3(g) (2003) (noting also that if a child preemptively requests to
contact a consular officer, and makes such contact, "the requirements of this section are
satisfied") (emphasis added). Although it is a step in the right direction to require that the
child get some guidance from an adult, there is nothing that suggests that friends or
parents more fully understand the intricacies of immigration law than the child or that
they are able to advise the child appropriately.
75. Perez-Funez v. INS, 619 F. Supp. 656 (1985).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 656.
78. Id. at 657 (also noting that other members of the class had similar stories).
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departure forms by telling him that he could not afford bail, and that if he
did not sign he would be detained for a long time.79 On behalf of all
members of the class, Perez-Funez sought not only a ruling that the INS
practices violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, but also
permanent injunctive relief "prohibiting the INS from effectuating
voluntary departure of class members without first providing certain
procedural safeguards to ensure a valid waiver of rights."8°
To determine what due process protections unaccompanied alien
children are entitled to, the court applied the due process balancing test
first articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge.81 At a bare minimum, persons at
risk of a loss of life, liberty, or property must receive notice and a
"meaningful opportunity to be heard., 82  The necessity of additional
procedural protections is determined under the Eldridge test by
weighing: (1) the individual's right affected; (2) the risk of erroneous
deprivation of the right and the value of additional safeguards; and
(3) the government's interest "including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burden that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.
83
First, the court found that "[u]naccompanied alien children possess
substantial constitutional and statutory rights" that "exist in spite of the
79. Id. In all, fifteen class members testified at trial and all stated that they signed a
voluntary departure form "unknowingly and unwillingly." Id. at 658.
80. Id. at 657.
81. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Over one hundred years of immigration jurisprudence
provides aliens with due process protection under the Fifth Amendment, which prohibits
the federal government from depriving any "person" of "life, liberty or property, without
due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Supreme Court's due process analysis
is a balancing approach that weighs both individual and governmental interests and
needs. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982) (describing the balancing
approach in deportation hearings) (citing Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334-35). This fluid and
flexible approach to due process encompasses a wide range of protections fitting the
unique circumstances of an individual's case. See Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34; see also
Haddad v. Ashcroft, 221 F, Supp. 2d 799, 802 (E.D. Mich. 2002) (noting that the nature
of due process protection varies "depending on status and circumstance").
The court sidestepped, however, the history of differential treatment of aliens based
on their status as "deportable" versus "excludable." It is well established that aliens in
deportation proceedings must be afforded due process protections under the Fifth
Amendment. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S, 678, 693-94 (2001) (stating that
entry into the country vests an alien with due process protections regardless of whether
the alien's presence "is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent"); Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (noting that, even aliens who enter
the country illegally may only be deported "after proceedings conforming to traditional
standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law"). Excludable aliens, on the
other hand, have not been given the same levels of protection. In fact, the extent to which
due process applies to inadmissible aliens is entirely unclear. See supra note 41.
82. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 348.
83. Plasencia, 459 U.S. at 34; see also Perez-Funez, 619 F. Supp. at 659.
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minors' illegal entry into the country. 84 Due process protections, the
court found, apply to both illegal and legal entrants.85 That fact, coupled
with the Supreme Court's recognition that "children have a very special
place in life which law should reflect,, 86 permitted the court to find that
unaccompanied alien children have a "substantial liberty interest" to a
"deportation hearing and the various rights associated therewith.,
87
Second, the court characterized voluntary departure as a waiver of
an individual's right to a deportation hearing.88  The court then
determined that INS procedures for effecting a waiver of the rights
associated with deportation hearings failed to ensure that such waivers
were knowing and voluntary. 89 Therefore, the court found that there was
a substantial risk of erroneous deprivation of an alien child's liberty
interest. 90 The court emphasized:
[U]naccompanied children of tender years encounter a stressful
situation in which they are forced to make critical decisions. Their
interrogators are foreign and authoritarian. The environment is new
and the culture completely different. The law is complex. The
children generally are questioned separately. In short, it is obvious to
the [c]ourt that the situation faced by unaccompanied minor aliens is
inherently coercive. 
91
Because of the great risk of erroneous deprivation under INS procedures,
the court determined that there was a high value to adopting alternative
safeguards, specifically, "access to telephones prior to presentation of the
voluntary departure form." 92
Finally, the court found that the government's interest in "ensuring
that class members make knowing and voluntary decisions" is also
furthered by telephone access and found that providing that access was
84. Perez-Funez, 619 F. Supp. at 659; see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77
(1976).
85. Perez-Funez, 619 F. Supp. at 659.
86. Id. (citing May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)); see also Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (finding that the State
"has a duty of the highest order to protect the interests of minor children, particularly
those of tender years").
87. Perez-Funez, 619 F. Supp. at 660.
88. Id. at 659-661.
89. Id. at 660. The court did note, however, that the plaintiffs had failed to prove
overt coercion on the part of the INS. Id. (noting that the INS had made a good faith
effort to carry out a "thankless task under adverse conditions").
90. Id. (identifying the liberty interest as being the right to a deportation hearing).
The court made this statement even though INS procedures provided additional
protections for certain groups of children. Specifically, those children who are
"permanent residents of Mexico or Canada." Id. at 663.
91. Id. at 662.
92. Id. at 664.
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not "unduly burdensome." 93 The Perez-Funez requirements have been
incorporated in the current laws regarding voluntary departure. In
reality, however, these procedures provide little meaningful protection.
Although children being offered voluntary departure are given
access to phones, and, in some instances, are required to make a phone
call, there is no guarantee that the person they call will be any more
knowledgeable than the child herself about immigration procedures, the
consequences of accepting voluntary departure, or any rights that the
child may have. 94 Therefore, a phone call may be merely a superficial
safeguard that does not provide meaningful legal protection. Courts have
noted that the situation faced by adult aliens who are offered voluntary
departure is so coercive that even notices about their rights are
ineffective in ensuring that those adults assert their rights. 95 Children,
given their unique vulnerabilities, less developed cognitive capacities,
limited exposure to legal institutions, and likely fear of adults and
authority figures, are even more susceptible to government coercion to
accept voluntary departure.96 Thus, the need for greater protections for
these children is overwhelming, and as we will see later, constitutionally
and statutorily required.
B. Asylum
If children are not offered voluntary departure, or refuse to take it,
they are placed in removal proceedings during which they can try to
apply for several forms of relief, including asylum. Although asylum is
available to both adults and children, it should come as no surprise that
children seeking asylum experience the process far differently than
adults.97
93. Id. at 667.
94. Children may call a "parent, close relative or friend." 8 C.F.R. § 236.3(g) (2003)
(stating that children may also make contact with a legal services organization, but not
requiring that children speak to someone with legal knowledge). Children from Mexico
or Canada are afforded greater protection because the U.S. is bound by treaty obligations
to contact the Mexican or Canadian embassy or consulate when nationals of those
countries are detained). Flores, 507 U.S. at 307 n.4.
95. The district court had previously addressed the need for procedural protections
for aliens offered voluntary departure in the context of adults and had found that the
situation facing adult aliens was so coercive that even notices failed to ameliorate
improper pressures. See Orantes-Hernandez v. Smith, 541 F. Supp. 351, 377 (C.D. Cal.
1982) (addressing due process for adult aliens in the voluntary departure context).
96. See Scharf& Hess, supra note 71, at 122-28 (discussing psychological research
on children's developmental capabilities and noting that often, "children cannot make a
knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of their legal rights").
97. See generally Stephen Yale-Loehr & Brian Palmer, Children's Asylum Claims:
Eligibility and Procedure, 5 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 655 (2000) (discussing children's
asylum claims generally and more specifically in the wake of the Elian Gonzalez case).
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United States statutory law regarding asylum is found at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1) and allows persons "physically present in the United States
or who arrive in the United States" to apply for asylum, provided they do
not fall within certain enumerated exceptions.9" Persons may only be
granted asylum if they are refugees as defined under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1 101(A)(42)(A). 99 U.S. law defines a refugee as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person's nationality
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any
country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is
unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail
himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion .... 100
Even if an individual is found to be a refugee, however, asylum
determinations are discretionary and the final power to grant asylum is
held by the U.S. Attorney General.'0 1
Historically, U.S. law failed to distinguish between adult and child
refugees in terms of protections, obligations, or definitions.)°
Commentators note that U.S. policy traditionally took a "one-size-fits-all
approach" that "frequently failed to take into account the unique situation
of children, including their stage of development and the impact that may
have on their ability to recollect and articulate traumatic experiences."'
0 3
This approach failed to acknowledge that children "may experience
persecution differently than adults."'
10 4
In 1998, however, the United States followed in Canada's
footsteps'0 5 and became the second country in the world to adopt
98. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1)-(2), (b)(1) (listing four exceptions to an alien's ability to
apply for asylum).
99. § 1158(b)(1); see also supra notes 9-10 (discussing international developments
regarding the definition of refugees and the United States' adoption of that definition).
100. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(A)(42)(A) (2003). This definition is nearly identical to that
under the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. See discussion supra note
9-10 (defining refugee under UN Conventions and Protocols).
101. 8U.S.C.§1158(b)(1).
102. Women's Commission, supra note 2, at 6 (noting that this failure to recognize
the unique characteristics of children essentially required children to "shed their
childhood for the purposes of a legal proceeding").
103. Women's Commission, supra note 2, at 5 (discussing children in the United
States asylum system and the historic treatment of children's asylum claims). If children
arrived accompanied, their claims were often simply subsumed under a parent's even if
the child's claim was the strongest of the family members. Id. If children arrived alone,
they were treated exactly like adults. Id.
104. Id. at6.
105. Canada's guidelines were implemented by the Immigration and Refugee Board
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guidelines for handling children's asylum claims. 106 The "Guidelines for
Children's Asylum Claims" ("Guidelines") °7 have been hailed as
"groundbreaking" '10 8 and are designed to "provide the Asylum Officer
Corps (AOC) with background and guidance on adjudicating children's
asylum claims." 10 9 The Guidelines generally address the need for "child-
sensitive interview procedures and analysis" and greater attention to the
"substantive and procedural aspects of claims."110  Among the steps
recommended by the INS to create a "child-friendly" interview, the AOC
is advised to ensure that, if possible, a trusted adult should be present
during the interview, 11 that interpreters and children fully understand
each other,1 2 that gender issues be taken into account, 3 and that asylum
officers build a rapport with child asylees. 14 Asylum officers are also
in 1996. See Chairpersons Guidelines, Child Refugee Claimants: Procedural and
Evidentiary Issues, available at http://www.cisr.gc.ca/en/about/guidelines/
child/index e.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2004) (on file with author). The Immigration
and Refugee Board ("IRB") is "an independent tribunal established by the Parliament of
Canada" and is responsible for determining refugee claims. See Nurjehan Mawani,
Hearing Our Children's Voices: Making the Rights of Children a Reality in Canada's
Refugee Process (May 22, 1998) (remarks before the International Association of
Women Judges Conference, Ottawa, Canada). The Canadian Guidelines were developed
in response to the large number of separated children arriving in Canada. Id. (noting that
in the process of determining refugee status "[i]t became clear that children, especially
those without family, should not be treated in the same way as adults ... and that more
appropriate procedures needed to be developed" to safeguard the child's best interests
and allow children to express "their views in a safe and supportive environment."). The
Guidelines "apply [only] to matters of procedure," they do not "deal with substantive
issues in refugee determination." Id.
Even before Canada, however, UNHCR published guidelines regarding the
treatment of children's asylum claims. See UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS 213 (1992) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
106. Women's Commission, supra note 2, at 6.
107. JEFF WEISS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDELINES FOR CHILDREN'S ASYLUM
CLAIMS I (December 10, 1998) [hereinafter GUIDELINES]; see also INS Guidelines for
Children's Asylum Claims, available at http://www.cnn.com/2000/US/04/21/1NS.ruling
(April 21, 2000) (on file with author) (discussing the Guidelines).
108. Women's Commission, supra note 2, at 6. The Guidelines themselves, however,
did note that both the UNHCR and Canada had already published comprehensive
guidelines for the treatment of child asylees. See GUIDELINES, supra note 107, at 2-4.
109. GUIDELINES, supra note 107, at 1.
110. Id. at 2. For a general discussion of the Guidelines, see Jacqueline Bhabha and
Wendy A. Young, Through a Child's Eyes: Protecting the Most Vulnerable Asylum
Seekers, 75 Interpreter Releases 775 (June 1, 1998); Women's Commission for Refugee
Women and Children, Protecting the Rights of Children: The Need for U.S. Children's
Asylum Guidelines, (Dec. 1998), available at http://www.womenscommission.org/
reports/index.html#us (last visited Sept. 12, 2004) (on file with author).
111. GUIDELINES, supra note 107, at 5.
112. Id. at7.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 7-10 (providing examples of opening statements, encouraging the use of
simple and straightforward language and highlighting the importance of non-verbal cues
and reassurance).
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cautioned against "assum[ing] that a child cannot have an asylum claim
independent of the parents."' 15
In addition to procedural considerations, the Guidelines provide
legal guidance to asylum officers.11 6 Although the Guidelines make clear
that the substantive standards for establishing refugee status for an
asylum claim is no different for children than for adults, the Guidelines
do recognize that, particularly for unaccompanied minors, age may
"affect the analysis of his or her refugee status" and that "in the
examination of the factual elements of the claim of an unaccompanied
child, particular regard should be given to circumstances such as the
child's stage of development, his/her possibly limited knowledge of
conditions in the country of origin, and their significance to the legal
concept of refugee status, as well as his/her special vulnerability."' 17
Thus, the Guidelines are a positive step towards appropriately
protecting the needs and vulnerabilities of unaccompanied minors,
however, much still remains to be done.1 18 The Guidelines are not law,
they are provided to the AOC only to "enhance the ability of INS
[alsylum [o]fficers to address more responsively the substantive and
procedural aspects of claims" and to "improve U.S. asylum
adjudications. ' 19 Further, although the Guidelines suggest that it is in
the child's "best interest" to have a "trusted adult" present during asylum
interviews, 12 the government is not bound to identify such an adult, to
provide a guardian if a trusted adult is not available or even to allow that
person to be present during the process. 121 The Guidelines recognize and
identify children's unique characteristics that place them at risk for being
115. Id. at 15.
116. Id. at 16.
117. Id. at 18 (citing HANDBOOK, supra note 105, at 213). The Guidelines note,
among other considerations that the harms suffered by children may be "relatively less
than [those of adults] and still qualify as persecution" given the different psychological
make-ups of children and adults. Id. at 19.
118. Another positive step is a pilot program in Arizona that "assign[s] trained
volunteers to unaccompanied minors held in a detention facility near Phoenix." Stanley
Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr, What Little Elian Taught Us, 5 BENDER'S IMMIGR.
BULL. 727 (Sept. 1, 2000) (describing the aftermath of Elian Gonzalez's court battles and
asylum process in the United States). The volunteers are to answer children's
immigration questions and to represent them in their immigration proceedings. Id.; see
also Raju Chebium, Refugee Children Could Get Advocates Under Pilot Program,
available at http://www.cnn.com/2000/LAW/06/30/phoenix.kids/ (last visited Sept. 12,
2004) (on file with author) (noting that the year-long program had "the government's
cooperation" and calling the volunteers "friend of the children," but reporting that the
volunteers are not trained to provide legal representation, rather they are to be a "trusted
adult figure" who can help a child "articulate his or her case to lawyers, if legal
representation is available") (emphasis added).
119. GUIDELINES, supra note 107, at 2.
120. Id. at 5-6.
121. See id.
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denied asylum, but fail to go far enough in ensuring that children's
voices are heard and that their applications are meaningfully evaluated.
C. Convention Against Torture
Aliens seeking protection in the United States may also make a
claim under the United Nations Convention Against Torture ("CAT").
22
Under Article 3 of the CAT, the United States cannot "expel, return
('refouler') or extradite a person to another State where there are
substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture."'' 23 Article 1 defines torture as "any act by which
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person ... by or at the instigation of or with the consent or
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity." 1
24
Unlike asylum, applicants for protection under CAT need not show
that they will be tortured based on one of the five statutory grounds
articulated in the definition of a refugee. 25 This makes eligibility for
CAT protection somewhat broader than that for asylum. However, the
United States, through a Senate resolution, adopted an interpretation of
the treaty which defines "substantial grounds for believing that [the
applicant] would be in danger of being subjected to torture" as meaning,
"if it is more likely than not that [the applicant] would be tortured."'
' 26
This is a higher standard than the one for asylum.127 Additionally, in the
122. United Nations: Draft Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 9, 1975, 23 I.L.M. Int'l Legal Materials 1027
(1984) [hereinafter CAT].
123. Id. at art. 3(1). Article 3 also requires that, when deciding if an applicant has
grounds for a CAT claim, a State must "take into account all relevant considerations
including, where applicable, the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern
of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights." Id. at art. 3(2).
124. Id. at art. 1(1) also stating that torture must be for the purposes of "obtaining
from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a
third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind").
125. See id. at art. 1 (written without consideration for one of the five protected
grounds); see also LEGOMSKY, supra note 40, at 1062.
126. Resolution of the United States Senate Ratifying the Convention Against
Torture, 101st Cong., 2d Session, 136 CONG. REC. S17, 491-92 (Oct. 27, 1990).
127. Asylum applicants must show that a "reasonable person in [those] circumstances
would fear persecution." Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I. & N. Dec. 439, 445 (BIA 1987);
see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(B) (2003) (stating that well-founded fear is established
where the applicant shows a "reasonable possibility of suffering such persecution"). The
Ninth Circuit has found that a well-founded fear exists where the applicant, "on the basis
of objective circumstances personally known to him, believes that he has at least a one in
ten chance" of being persecuted. Montecino v. INS, 915 F.2d 518, 520 (9th Cir. 1990);
see also Martirosyan v. INS, 229 F.3d 903, 909 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding again that a one
in ten chance of persecution satisfies the well-founded fear of persecution element of an
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United States, CAT applicants are only eligible for withholding or
deferral of removal.128 This is in stark contrast to the more permanent
protection afforded under asylum law. 129 However, CAT protection is
not subject to the discretion of the Attorney General, therefore, if an
applicant is eligible for withholding or deferral of removal under CAT,
he or she receives it without having to obtain a discretionary grant of
relief.13°
The United States again draws no distinctions between adults and
children in terms of eligibility for CAT protection and, unlike the asylum
Guidelines, the INS Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services
("BCIS") has not published standards for immigration judges or officers
to explain how children may experience torture differently than adults or
how children may have greater difficulty discussing traumatic events. In
addition to potential problems with a lack of sensitivity towards
interviewing or evaluating CAT claims, however, some practical
considerations suggest that certain children are likely to be ineligible for
CAT relief. For example, trafficked children are unlikely to be eligible
for CAT relief because the CAT does not apply where the torture is
committed by private actors, unless the government acquiesces to the
torture.131 Therefore, unless a government is willfully blind or gives its
approval to trafficking or smuggling children for illegal purposes, no
matter how vile or harmful those activities are, CAT will not provide a
form of relief. In addition, CAT does not extend to "entities that a
government is unable to control." 132 This may cut off relief for children
who are pressed into service as child soldiers by rebel groups.
D. Special Immigrant J Visas
One of the few immigration provisions tailored solely to children is
the Special Immigrant J Visa ("J visa"). 133 This special visa, created by
the Immigration Act of 1990,134 originally allowed children present in the
asylum claim).
128. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.17 (2003) (discussing deferral of removal); 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.16(c) (2003) (discussing withholding of removal).
129. An alien granted asylum is allowed to stay in the United States as an asylee and
after one year, if the asylee is still admissible, he or she may receive lawful permanent
resident status. 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a) (2003).
130. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (2003) (discussing discretionary grants for asylum, but
stating no such requirement for CAT relief).
131. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
132. PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, 34 T ANNUAL IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
INSTITUTE 32 (Austin T. Fragomen, Jr. & Cynthia J. Lange, co-chairs, 2001); see also
Matter of S-V-, Int. Dec. 3430 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306 (BIA 2000).
133. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(27)(J) (2003).
134. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 153, 104 Stat. 4978, 5005
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United States to receive the visa if: (1) they had been declared dependent
in a U.S. juvenile court and "placed under the custody of a state
agency" 135; and (2) a determination was made that it was not in the
child's "best interest to be returned to [his or her] previous country of
nationality or country of last [habitual] residence.' 36 J visas have unique
benefits, in that they provide a waiver of certain grounds of removal.
37
Like much else in immigration law, however, the standards for eligibility
underwent substantial changes in 1996 with the passage of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA").1
3 8
These changes make it more difficult for children to receive J visas.
Today, J visas are still available to unmarried persons under twenty-
one years of age (1) who have been declared dependent in a U.S. juvenile
court, such that the court deems the alien eligible for long-term foster
care or commits him/her to state custody on the basis of abuse, neglect or
abandonment; and (2) for whom an administrative or judicial
determination is made that it is not in the alien's best interest to return to
his/her country of nationality or last residence. 39 However, J visas are
more difficult to obtain because of two significant additions to the
statutory language.140 First, after a child is adjudicated dependent by a
juvenile court, the "Attorney General must expressly consent to the
dependency order serving as a precondition to the grant" of the J visa.
14
Second, if an alien child is in "actual or 'constructive' custody of the
INS," the child must get INS consent "before a juvenile court may have
(1990); see also Stephen Yale-Loehr & Christoph Hoashi-Erhardt, Special Juvenile
Immigrants, 6 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 658 (July 1, 2001).
135. Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 134, at 658 (internal citation omitted).
The regulations clarified the statutory language by broadly defining "juvenile court" to
include any "court having jurisdiction under state law to make judicial determinations
about the custody and care of juveniles." Id.; see also 70 Interpreter Releases 1304 (Oct.
4, 1993); Gao v. Jenifer, 185 F.3d 548 (6th Cir. 1999) (allowing entry of a dependency
order by a probate court).
136. Pub. L. No.101-649, § 153(a)(3), 104 Stat. 4978, 5006 (stating that the
determination had to be made by an administrative or judicial proceeding.); see also
Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 134, at 658.
137. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h)(2)(B) (2003); see also Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt,
supra note 134, at 659 (discussing the grounds for inadmissibility and deportability that
are waived for juveniles receiving J visas, including entry without inspection, likelihood
of becoming a public charge, applying for admission without a valid entry document,
lacking labor certification, inadmissibility at time of entry, failure to maintain non-
immigrant status, and failure to notify INS of change of address).
138. Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 134, at 658 (also noting the oddity of
congressional amendment because the visa was so rarely used).
139. Id. at 663. (summarizing what is similar to 1990 J visa).
140. Id. at 658; see also id. at 664 n.4 (noting that the numbers of J visas granted
dropped from 390 in 1996 to 287 in 1998).
141. Id. at 659.
[Vol. 109:2
ON THE WAY TO GRANDMOTHER'S HOUSE
jurisdiction to determine her custody status or placement. 142
Although these two changes make it more difficult for all children
to receive J visas, the provision precluding juvenile court jurisdiction
over detained aliens potentially has particularly serious consequences for
unaccompanied juvenile minors. Children arrested and detained by the
INS are clearly in INS custody. 143 When children are released into foster
care pending determination of their immigrant status, they are arguably
in "constructive" INS custody. 144 Although the federal government has
not defined what "constructive custody" is, a 1998 memo ("Cook
Memo") sent by Thomas Cook, then Acting Assistant Commissioner for
Adjudications to all Directors and Counsels, states: "[j]uveniles 'in foster
care are still in the legal custody of the INS despite the delegation of
physical custody to social service agencies who can better accommodate
their needs."",145 Thus, because unaccompanied juvenile minors who are
not released to parents, legal guardians, or adult relatives are detained in
detention facilities or placed with "appropriate agencies authorized to
accommodate juveniles," state juvenile courts will only be given
jurisdiction to make dependency determinations for detained minors if:
(1) the juvenile is aware that she/he must petition the INS to grant
jurisdiction to the juvenile court to make a dependency determination;
and (2) the INS then exercises its discretion to give the court
jurisdiction.
146
Commentators have strongly criticized the government's position in
this matter. One article asserts that the government's position,
begs the question of why it should be in the Service's discretion to
prevent a child who has been abused, neglected, or abandoned, to
avail herself of state court protection. INS care is inherently
temporary because it necessarily ends upon release from custody or
removal. To assert that such care is a satisfactory substitute for long-
term foster care attributes to INS custody qualities that it necessarily
142. Id.
143. Id. at 663.
144. As of April 24, 2002, the federal government had yet to define "constructive
custody." In 2001, Stephen Yale-Loehr and Christoph Hoashi-Erhardt noted a similar
absence of regulatory guidance as to what constructive custody means. Yale-Loehr &
Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 134, at 662 (noting that as of May 2001, the "INS has not
published regulations defining what constitutes 'constructive custody"').
145. Id. at 663 (quoting INS Memoranda, 3 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 1067 (Oct. 15,
1998) (memorandum from Thomas Cook providing interim guidance to INS directors
and counsels on J visa matters)).
146. Although the INS is unclear as to precisely what constitutes NS custody where a
juvenile is not being held in a detention facility, it seems well-accepted that children
paroled to the care of a family member or legal guardian or "in the care of an entity not
funded by INS" are not in INS custody. See Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note
134, at 663.
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precludes. 1
47
The Cook Memo takes the position that the new restrictions on J visas
were designed to prevent "individuals who did not suffer abuse,
abandonment, or neglect [from seeking] the court's protection merely to
avail themselves of legal permanent resident status." Yet,
unaccompanied alien minors who seem the most likely to have suffered
abuse, abandonment, or neglect, and to be in need of protection, now
face additional barriers to receiving a J visa. The INS should not have
the ability to veto a juvenile court's power to determine whether a child
is dependent. The INS has "no experience in determining the best
interests of children," and further, federal executive branch authority in
family matters is, and should remain, limited. 
48
E. Exploited Persons: T and U Visas
In recognition that children and women have become the victims of
ever-widening rings of trafficking, Congress created two new visas for
victims of this kind of abuse. 149 In 2000, Congress created a new visa for
"victims of severe forms of trafficking."' 150 These "T visas" are available
to both adults and children, although children are exempted from one of
the requirements. 151 First, the alien must be the victim of a "severe form
of trafficking."' 152 Second, the alien must be physically present in the
147. Yale-Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 134, at 662 (characterizing the INS
position as standing "on dubious reasoning indeed").
148. Katherine Porter, Note: In the Best Interests of the INS: An Analysis of the 1997
Amendment to the Special Immigrant Juvenile Law, 27 J. LEGIS. 441, 442 (2001) (arguing
that the amendments to J visas prevent needy children from obtaining legal status in the
United States and essentially bases provision of J visas on whether the child successfully
evades INS detection before he/she comes under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court);
see also Vikram K. Badrinath, Challenging the INS on State Court Juvenile Matters,
2002 NIP-ICAN 9 (2002) (discussing J visas generally).
149. See Stephen Yale-Loehr, Christina Sherman, Christoph Hoashi-Erhardt & Brian
Palmer, T, U and V Visas: More Alphabet Soup for Immigration Practitioners, 6
BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 113, 113-14 (Feb. 1, 2001) (noting that approximately 50,000
persons, predominately women and children, are trafficked into the United States every
year for purposes including prostitution and "slavery-like labor"); see also U.S. Dep't of
State, Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act 2000, Trafficking in Persons
Report (June 2002), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10815.pdf
(last visited Sept. 12, 2004) (on file with author) (providing descriptions and statistics
regarding international trafficking).
150. 8 U.S.C. § 110 1(a)(15)(T)(i)(I) (2003).
151. § 1101(a)(15)(T)(i)(llI)(bb).
152. § 110 1(a)(15)(T)(i)(1). The definition of "severe form of trafficking" is found in
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. 22 U.S.C. § 7102(8) (2003) (defining
severe trafficking as:
(A) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or
coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained
18 years of age; or
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United States or at a valid point of entry as a result of that trafficking.153
Third, the alien must show that she would "suffer extreme hardship
involving unusual and severe harm upon removal."' 5 4  Finally, if the
alien is over fifteen years old, she must "compl[y] with any reasonable
request for assistance in the investigation or prosecution of acts of
trafficking," but children fifteen and under are exempt from this
requirement. 155 T visa holders may work 56 and after three years, the visa
holder is eligible for lawful permanent resident status.
157
In 2000, Congress also created "U visas" under the Violence
Against Women Act of 2000 ("VAWA").158  U visas are designed to
provide visas for victims of "substantial physical or mental abuse, 159
where those victims have information about, and will assist in,
investigations and prosecutions of that abusive criminal activity.
1 60
Although children under sixteen years old are not required to aid in
criminal investigations or prosecutions themselves, in order to be eligible
for a U visa, a "parent, guardian, or next friend" of the child must
possess and share information about the criminal activity.' 61 Therefore,
there is a greater burden on children to aid the authorities to obtain a U
visa than there is with a V visa; however, unlike V visas, U visas do not
(B) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a
person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the
purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or
slavery).
153. § 1 l01(a)(15)(T)(i)(II).
154. § I l01(a)(15)(T)(i)(IV).
155. § 1 101(a)(15)(T)(i)(III)(bb); 8 U.S.C. § 1 184(n)(2) (2003) (stating that T visas
are limited to 5,000 a year); see also § 1184(n)(3) (noting that the cap applies only to
principle aliens and not to family members granted visas by virtue of the principle alien's
visa).
156. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(i)(2).
157. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(1)(1)(A)-(C) (2003) (providing that the alien has "been
physically present" in the U.S. "for a continuous period of at least 3 years since the date
of admission," has "been a person of good moral character," has "complied with any
reasonable request for assistance" in trafficking investigations or prosecutions and can
show that removal would inflict "extreme hardship involving unusual and severe harm").
158. 8 U.S.C. § 1 l01(a)(15)(U). VAWA is part of the Victims of Trafficking and
Violence Protection Act of 2000. Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1464 (Oct. 28, 2000).
159. § 1 l01(a)(15)(U)(i)(1). The types of abuse include: "rape; torture; trafficking;
incest; domestic violence; sexual assault; abusive sexual contact; prostitution; sexual
exploitation; female genital mutilation; being held hostage; peonage; involuntary
servitude; slave trade; kidnapping; abduction; unlawful criminal restraint; [and] false
imprisonment .. " § 1 01(a)(15)(U)(iii).
160. § 1 l01(a)(15)(U)(i)(II)-(III). In fact, the law requires that the visa petition
contain a certification from "a Federal, State, or local law enforcement official,
prosecutor, judge" or other authority that states that "the alien 'has been helpful, is being
helpful, or is likely to be helpful' in the investigation or prosecution of criminal activity."
8 U.S.C. § 1184(o)(1) (quoting § I 101(a)(15)(U)(i)(III)).
161. § 1101(a)(15)(U)(i)(II)-(III).
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require children to show that they would suffer a severe hardship if they
were removed. As with T visa holders, U visa holders may work and
may apply for lawful permanent resident status after three years,
provided they meet certain statutory requirements. 1
62
Both of these visas provide much-needed relief for children. For
example, a child who has been trafficked may not qualify for asylum
because he or she is unable to show persecution on one of the five
statutorily protected grounds. 163 Age alone has not been recognized as a
cognizable social group, and children are likely trafficked because they
are a vulnerable and desirable commodity, not because they have
particular political beliefs or are of a particular race, religion, or
nationality. 64  Additionally, children who are trafficked may not be
eligible for CAT relief unless a court finds that the traffickers had both
government cooperation or acquiescence, and that those activities fell
within the Convention's definition of torture. 165  Therefore, children
smuggled into the United States for illegal purposes may benefit from the
availability of these visas. However, it is possible that children may not
know that they have been trafficked or may be too ashamed to speak
about what has happened to them. Therefore, many victims may go
undetected by the government and may be removed before anyone
discovers that, in fact, the child was eligible. Although the visas exempt
children under fifteen and sixteen (for T and U visas, respectively) from
having to aid in criminal investigations, 66 the line of demarcation fails to
take into account the fact that children over fifteen and sixteen may be
equally unable or unwilling to aid in investigations because of fear of
reprisals, intense shame, or psychological trauma. Forcing these
162. See 8 U.S.C. § 1184(o)(3) (stating that the "Attorney General shall, during the
period those aliens are in lawful temporary resident status ... provide the aliens with
employment authorization"); § 1255(I)(l)(A)-(B) (allowing adjustment of status so long
as the visa holder has been "physically present in the United States for a continuous
period of at least 3 years since the date of admission" and where "in the opinion of the
Attorney General, the alien's continued presence in the United States is justified on
humanitarian grounds, to ensure family unity, or is otherwise in the public interest");
§ 1 184(o)(2)(A)-(B) (providing that there "is a 10,000 per year limit on U visas, although
the cap does not include family members granted U visas as a derivative of the principle
visa holder .... )).
163. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(42)(A).
164. See GUIDELINES, supra note 107, at 25 (noting that age-based claims are
"unlikely to be sufficiently discrete to establish persecution" on the basis of membership
in a particular social group); see also Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991)
(noting that youth and gender are unlikely by themselves to "endow individuals with
membership in a particular group").
165. See supra notes 122-132 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements for
a claim under the CAT).
166. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(15)(T)(i)(Ill)(bb) (referring to T visas);
§ I 101(a)(15)(U)(i)(II)-(III) (referring to U visas).
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adolescents to describe their experiences to law enforcement, attorneys,
and judges may be psychologically harmful long lasting consequences.
The existence of these visas, however, is a step in the right direction
towards providing necessary protections for vulnerable children.
V. Treatment of Children in Removal Proceedings
An understanding of the forms of relief available to unaccompanied
alien children, however, is only one step towards understanding the
untenable position unaccompanied children are in when the authorities
apprehend them. The removal process encompasses not only a child's
eligibility for certain forms of relief, but also placement determinations
during that process. Pending determinations of a child's immigration
status, he or she either is released to family members or guardians or is
detained.
A. Release
Juveniles who do not accept voluntary departure and are released
from INS custody must be released "in order of preference" to a parent, a
legal guardian, or an adult relative not in INS detention. 16  Thus,
immigration regulations pose particular problems for unaccompanied
alien children who, by definition, are alone and are less likely to have
relatives who can claim them. The recently enacted Homeland Security
Organization Act ("HSA") 168 also specifically prohibits the release of
unaccompanied minors on "their own recognizance. ' 't 69 Additionally,
there is evidence that the INS has used this provision in the past to coerce
relatives of detained juveniles to turn themselves in to the authorities
when those relatives are in the United States illegally. 70 Where parents
167. 8 C.F.R. § 236.3(b)(1)(i)-(iii) (2003); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)-(b) (stating
that all decisions regarding release are to be made at the Attorney General's discretion
and that bond or parole may be revoked at any time).
168. 6 U.S.C. § 279 (2003).
169. 6 U.S.C. § 279(b)(2)(B) (stating that the Director of the Office of Refugee
Resettlement "shall not release such children upon their own recognizance").
170. See Hearings, supra note 2 (written statement of Wendy Young) (indicating that
the INS has "required undocumented relatives to appear at its offices to accept custody of
children, at which time it issues a Notice to Appear to the relative" and that the INS
"adheres to this policy even when other relatives, responsible adults, or licensed
placements" are willing to take the child); see also Oral statement of Wendy Young,
available at http://www.womenscommission.org/take action/testimony.html (last visited
Sept. 12, 2004) (on file with author) (Ms. Young also recounted the story of a sixteen-
year-old boy whom the INS refused to release "because they [were] aware that his
undocumented brother reside[d] in the U.S."); see also id. (oral statement of Wendy
Young), available at http://www.womenscommission.org/take action/testimony.html
(last visited Sept. 12, 2004) (on file with author). Hearings, supra note 2 (written
statement of Wendy Young) (noting that as of February 2002, the INS had chosen to
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are either in INS detention or outside the United States, the INS will only
release juveniles if the parent identifies, in a sworn affidavit, a person to
whom the juvenile may be released,' 7' and if that identified person
formally agrees to "care for the juvenile and to ensure the juvenile's
presence at all future proceedings before the Service or an immigration
judge.', 72  Only in "unusual or compelling circumstances" will the
government release a juvenile to other adults, and those adults must still
formally agree to care for the child and ensure that he or she is present at
all future proceedings.173  Although the provision protects children
against release to predatory adults falsely claiming to be relatives, it also
decreases the likelihood that unaccompanied children will be released. 1
74
B. Detentions
If children are not released, they are detained pending the outcome
of their immigration proceedings. Both the HSA and federal regulations
allow for the detention of unaccompanied minors. 7' Detention under the
regulations is broadly permissible when "determined to be necessary"
and may involve interim placement in "any Service detention facility
having separate accommodations for juveniles.' 76 The standards of care
and treatment of separated children were established in a consent decree
commonly referred to as the "Flores settlement agreement."' 177  That
settlement ended over a decade of litigation regarding the treatment of
detain the boy for eight months, including time in an adult prison rather than release him
to licensed shelters willing to take him). Hearings, supra note 2 (written statement of
Wendy Young).
171. 8 C.F.R. § 236.3(b)(3) (noting that the affidavit may be "executed before an
immigration officer or consular officer").
172. 8 C.F.R. § 236(b)(3).
173. Id. § 236.3(b)(4).
174. In fact, current law regarding placements for unaccompanied alien juveniles
explicitly states that placement decisions should be made with an eye to protecting these
children from "smugglers, traffickers, or others who might seek to victimize or otherwise
engage them in criminal, harmful or exploitive activity." 6 U.S.C. § 279(b)(1)(C),
(b)(2)(A)(ii). Because unaccompanied alien children are by definition alone, and because
they cannot be released on "their own recognizance," it is reasonable to expect that their
chances of being detained will increase. Id. § 279(b)(2)(B).
175. 6 U.S.C. § 279(b)(1)(J)(iv); 8 C.F.R. § 236.3.
176. 8 C.F.R. § 236.3(d) (allowing the Service to hold the juvenile or place him or her
in a detention facility). The regulations suggest that the government should find "suitable
placement of the juvenile in a facility designated for the occupancy of juveniles"
including "juvenile facilities contracted by the Service, state or local juvenile facilities, or
other appropriate agencies authorized to accommodate juveniles by the laws of the state
or locality." Id. § 236.3(c). This suggestion, however, does not preclude the placement
of unaccompanied juvenile minors, whose only "crime" is entering the country
unlawfully, in facilities or cells with serious juvenile offenders, or placing
unaccompanied minors in adult facilities, so long as there are separate areas for juveniles.
177. Women's Commission, supra note 2, at 9.
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alien children in INS detention.
1. Reno v. Flores
Prior to 1984, INS policy was to release unaccompanied minors
pending the resolution of their immigration status to a responsible adult
who would promise to bring the child to immigration court when
required. 178 In 1984, the Western Regional Office of the INS changed its
regional policy. 179 The new policy mandated that unaccompanied alien
children in deportation proceedings would only be released to a parent or
guardian unless "unusual and extraordinary" circumstances warranted
release to another adult.' 80 In 1985, a class action suit, Flores v. Meese,
challenged the new policy.' 8' The four named plaintiffs represented a
class "consisting of all aliens under the age of 18 who [were] detained by
the INS Western Region because 'a parent or legal guardian fail[ed] to
personally appear to take custody of them."",182  The suit alleged
constitutional, statutory and international law violations and "objected to
conditions of detention."'183 The district court granted partial summary
judgment to the INS on the statutory and international law claims 84 and
granted Flores partial summary judgment on a constitutional equal
protection claim.185 The district court also approved a consent decree
that "settled all claims regarding the detention conditions.' 86 The court
waited to rule on Flores's due process claim, however, until after the INS
had issued revised regulations that complied with equal protection and
incorporated the Western Region's more stringent regulations. 187 The
district court then found that the new regulation violated due process.
88
On appeal, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
178. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 295 (1993).
179. Id. at 296.
180. Id.
181. The district court's opinion is unpublished. Flores, 507 U.S. at 299 (noting that
the opinion was unpublished, but providing a citation of Flores v. Meese, No. CV 85-
4544-RJK (Px) (C.D. Cal. May 25, 1988)); see also Gail Quick Goeke, Note: Substantive
and Procedural Due Process for Unaccompanied Alien Juveniles, 60 Mo. L. REv. 221,
221-22 (1995) (discussing the procedural history of Reno v. Flores).
182. Flores, 507 U.S. at 296 (citing Appellant's Brief at 29). The four class
representatives were all female juveniles from El Salvador. Goeke, supra note 181, at
221 n.6.
183. See Goeke, supra note 181, at 221-22 (discussing the procedural history of Reno
v. Flores).
184. Flores, 507 U.S. at 296.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 296-97; see also Flores v. Meese, 942 F.2d 1352, 1355 (9th Cir. 1991)
(noting that during the course of the litigation, "the INS codified the regional policy into
the nationally applicable regulation now at issue").
188. Flores, 507 U.S. at 298-9.
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Ninth Circuit reversed. 189  In an en banc hearing, however, the Ninth
Circuit vacated the panel decision and affirmed the decision of the
district court.' 90 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.' 9'
In Reno v. Flores,192 the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's
ruling and remanded the case to the district court. 193 The Court rejected
both the plaintiffs' substantive due process claim that "alien juveniles
suspected of being deportable have a 'fundamental' right to 'freedom
from physical restraint' ' , 194 and their procedural due process claim that,
to satisfy due process, the INS regulation must make individualized
determinations regarding detention for juveniles who "lack an approved
custodian."' 195  Although the Court noted that unaccompanied alien
children do have due process rights, 196 the Court found that the
regulations provided both adequate due process and a "reasonable
response to the difficult problems presented when the Service arrests
unaccompanied alien juveniles."
197
On remand, the district court approved a settlement between the
plaintiffs and the government. 198 Today, the Flores agreement provides
the "legal framework for the custodial care and treatment of
unaccompanied newcomer children."' 99 The Flores agreement applies to
"[a]ll minors who are detained in the legal custody of the INS." °00 The
189. Id. at 299.
190. Id.
191. Id. (citing Barr v. Flores, 503 U.S. 905 (1992)).
192. 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
193. Id. at315.
194. Id. at 299-300 (citing Respondents' Brief at 16).
195. Id. at 300. The Court also found that it was within the Attorney General's
authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) to promulgate the rule. Id.
196. Id. at 306,
197. Flores, 507 U.S. at 315.
198. See Women's Commission, supra note 2, at 9.
199. Id. The agreement, originally set to expire in January 2002, was to provide the
basis for an INS regulation that would "incorporate the provisions of the agreement." Id.
A proposed regulation was published in 1998 but was never finalized. See Processing,
Detention, and Release of Juveniles, 63 Fed. Reg. 39759 (proposed July 24, 1998); see
also Women's Commission, supra note 2, at 9. To avoid a lapse in the legal framework
governing INS detention of children, the INS "agreed to re-publish its proposed rule and
extend implementation of the agreement until the regulation is finalized." Women's
Commission, supra note 2, at 9; see also Processing, Detention, and Release of Juveniles,
67 Fed. Reg. 1670 (Jan. 14, 2002). At the time this article is being written, the comment
period for the re-publication of the proposed rule has been closed for over a year, but no
final action on the regulation has been taken. The most recent update from the
Department of Justice, issued on December 9, 2002, indicates that final action is to be
taken in April 2003. Regulatory Agenda: Processing, Detention, and Release of
Juveniles, 67 Fed. Reg. 74657, 74717 (Dec. 9, 2002) (noting first that publication of the
regulations was delayed by the enactment of the AEDPA and IIRIRA and then stating
that final action on the rule is expected in April 2003).
200. Flores v. Reno Settlement Agreement, III (Nov. 30, 1987), available at
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overarching goal of the agreement is to ensure that the INS treats "all
minors in its custody with dignity, respect and special concern for their
particular vulnerability as minors."'2° Specifically, the Flores agreement
requires the INS to "place each detained minor in the least restrictive
setting appropriate to the minor's age and special needs, provided that
such setting is consistent with its interests to ensure the minor's timely
appearance before the INS and the immigration courts and to protect the
minor's well-being and that of others. 20 2  The agreement covers
numerous issues regarding children in detention including "release to
family members or other responsible entities, placement, transportation,
monitoring, and attorney-client visitation, 20 3  and provides for
"minimum standards of care for licensed programs with which the INS
contracts for the placement of children in its custody. 20 4
Today, despite the Flores settlement agreement, detention
conditions for unaccompanied alien children are "extremely poor.,
20 5
Conditions within detention facilities often result in children being
housed with adults or violent juvenile offenders, and being denied
developmentally appropriate stimuli such as playtime for young children
or social interaction for adolescents.20 6 Aside from the conditions inside
http://htmlweb.centerforhumanrights.net:8080/centerforhumanrights/children/Document.
2004-06-18.8124043749 (last visited Sept. 12, 2004) [hereinafter Flores Agreement] (on
file with author); see also Women's Commission, supra note 2, at 10.
201. Flores Agreement, supra note 200, at IV; see also Women's Commission, supra
note 2, at 10.
202. Flores Agreement, supra note 200, at IV.
203. Women's Commission, supra note 2, at 9.
204. Id. at 10.
205. SLIPPING THROUGH, supra note 22, at 1 (characterizing the detention conditions
as violating children's rights "under international law, the U.S. Constitution, U.S.
statutory provisions, INS regulations, and the terms of court orders binding on the INS");
see also Women's Commission, supra note 2, at 33-34 (noting that conditions varied
dramatically from facility to facility). Human Rights Watch visited detention centers in
California and Arizona and found consistent violations of the Flores consent decree,
including (1) failing to translate forms that minors must sign into Spanish and other
languages or to provide interpreters to explain the forms to children; (2) failing to provide
educational programs; (3) failing to provide books or educational programs in languages
other than English; (4) refusing to provide appropriate recreational facilities and
opportunities; (5) refusing to provide appropriate numbers of meals; (6) commingling
alien children with juvenile offenders; (7) restricting children's ability to worship; and
(8) detaining children in detention facilities for extensive periods of time, when those
children should be in less restrictive placements. Id. at 27-54.
206. See generally SLIPPING THROUGH, supra note 23 (finding consistent violations of
the Flores consent decree in California and Arizona detention centers, including
(1) failing to translate forms that minors must sign into Spanish and other languages or to
provide interpreters to explain the forms to children; (2) failing to provide educational
programs; (3) failing to provide books or educational programs in languages other than
English; (4) refusing to provide appropriate recreational facilities and opportunities;
(5) refusing to provide appropriate numbers of meals; (6) commingling alien children
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the facilities, detained children face a host of other problems, including
denial of access to legal aid or information, 0 7 inability to post bond,2
restricted or prohibited ability to communicate with outside contacts
(either by phone or mail), 20 9 frequent transfers, 210 and geographic
isolation from supportive communities.2 ' In short, the practical reality is
that children who arrive in the United States unaccompanied are
profoundly alone and U.S. policies and treatment further isolate them by
failing to provide placements that meet children's developmental and
legal needs.
VI. Critique of the Current System
As discussed above, U.S. immigration law fails to appropriately
protect unaccompanied alien children. Current policies, despite the
adoption of the Guidelines regarding children's asylum claims and recent
changes under the HSA regarding agency responsibility for
unaccompanied alien minors, fail to efficiently and appropriately assist
children on a variety of fronts. While changes to particular statutory
provisions and forms of relief may be helpful, the defects discussed
above can only be remedied with global, systemic changes to how
children are treated in our immigration system. Because recent
congressional attempts to change the system have been unsuccessful, it
may ultimately fall to the courts to ensure that unaccompanied child
aliens receive the protections to which they are entitled.
2 12
with juvenile offenders; (7) restricting children's ability to worship; and (8) detaining
children in detention facilities for extensive periods of time, when those children should
be in less restrictive placements).
207. SLIPPING THROUGH, supra note 22 at 1.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 41-42 (noting that of the facilities visited for the report, many either denied
children access to phones or had only broken phones-where phones worked there were
rarely instructions on how to dial and even less often staff willing to help children make
calls). In addition to having difficulty accessing phones, children have even less ability
to make phone calls than adults because "adult detainees can make free phone calls to
secure pro bono representation, while children may be forced to make collect calls to find
an attorney, often at exorbitant rates." Leslie Castro, et al., Perversities and Prospects:
Whither Immigration Enforcement and Detention in the Anti-Terrorism Aftermath, 9
GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1, 7-8 (2002) (introductory remarks of Chris Nugent).
210. SLIPPING THROUGH, supra note 22, at 32.
211. Id. at 33-36. Additionally, children may be strip-searched, held in solitary
confinement, and forced to "wear prison uniforms and shackles." Hearings, supra note 2
(statement of William Schulz, Executive Director, Amnesty International USA).
212. In the wake of September 11, 2001, Congress enacted legislation creating the
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"). 6 U.S.C. § I 11(a) (2004) (stating that
"[t]here is established a Department of Homeland Security, as an executive department of
the United States within the meaning of title 5, United States Code"). During the year of
debates leading up to the passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ("HSA"), 6
U.S.C. § 101 (2004), the issue of unaccompanied minors was rarely discussed because
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the attention of both politicians and pundits was firmly focused on the larger issues of
terrorism and civil liberties. See Castro, et al., supra note 209, at 15 (remarks by Andrew
Morton) (tellingly stating that "frankly, this is just not the political climate where
members of Congress are going to go out on a limb and promote what possibly might be
perceived as pro-immigrant legislation"). During that time, however, several members of
Congress drafted a bill that contained the promise of greater protections for
unaccompanied children.
In direct contrast to the stringent changes proposed in immigration law generally,
these members of Congress drafted and introduced the "Unaccompanied Alien Child
Protection Act" ("UACPA"). See S.121, 107th Cong. (2001), LEXIS 2001 S.121
[hereinafter S. 121]. For insight into the general approach to matters of immigration law
at the time, see Hearings, supra note 2 (statement of Orrin Hatch, United States Senator)
(noting that despite the tightening of "immigration laws and procedures that have left us
vulnerable to those who would seek to do us harm," there was a need to "remember our
humanitarian legacy when it comes to special consideration of the immigration status of
particularly vulnerable classes of people").
Introduced in the House of Representatives by Representative Zoe Lofgren, and by
Senator Diane Feinstein in the Senate, the bill aimed to protect unaccompanied alien
children and to streamline and coordinate government actions affecting them. See H.R.
1904, 107th Cong. (2001), LEXIS 2001 H.R. 1904 [hereinafter H.R. 1904] (indicating
that Rep. Lofgren introduced the bill on May 17, 2001 and that it was co-sponsored by 91
representatives); S.121, supra (indicating that Senator Feinstein introduced the bill on
January 22, 2001 and that it was co-sponsored by 17 senators).
The underlying goal of the legislation was to "help unaccompanied alien children
navigate the U.S. immigration process." Erin E. O'Connor, Developments in the
Legislative Branch: Unaccompanied Child Protection Act of 2001, 16 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J.
259, 259 (2001); see also S.121, supra, § 2 (stating that the purposes of the Act were to:
(1) recognize the special needs and circumstances unaccompanied alien
children encounter when navigating the immigration system of the United
States;
(2) establish new governmental structures to ensure that the United States
Government meets the special needs of unaccompanied alien children;
(3) ensure that United States Government authorities hold the best interests of
the child paramount when making decisions regarding an unaccompanied alien
child;
(4) establish Government policy in favor of family reunification whenever
possible and, when family reunification is not possible, placement of
unaccompanied alien children in foster care, with qualified, adult guardians or
with voluntary agencies, rather than placing such children in detention;
(5) provide minimum standards for custody of unaccompanied alien children;
(6) ensure that unaccompanied alien children in immigration proceedings have
appointed counsel and guardians ad litem, and that such counsel and guardians
ad litem have access to the child;
(7) ensure that children awaiting adjudication of their immigration status not
"age-out" while awaiting processing by the Service of their petitions and
applications; and
(8) strengthen opportunities for permanent protection of such children for
whom such protection is warranted.).
Unfortunately, the bill, when passed bore little resemblance to its original form and
did not contain the important provisions requiring the appointment of counsel and
guardians ad litem. See Senate Approves Feinstein Provisions on Unaccompanied Alien
Minors and Information Sharing as Part of Homeland Security Bill, Nov. 15, 2002,
available at http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/releases02/r-dhs2.htm. Senator Feinstein
reintroduced the bill on May 22, 2003. The bill, now known as S. 1129, has languished in
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First, constitutional due process demands that unaccompanied alien
children be provided with counsel as soon as they are apprehended by the
BCIS.2 13 Although removal proceedings are civil, they impose severe
consequences on aliens and require far greater safeguards than those that
currently exist.214  In delinquency proceedings, another non-criminal
context, the Supreme Court acknowledges the importance of counsel for
children. 21 5 As Justice Fortas noted in In re Gault:216
[T]he juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with the
problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon
the regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a
defense and to prepare and submit it. The child requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him.
2 '
Thus, in Gault, the Supreme Court held that due process demands that
children in juvenile delinquency proceedings have counsel. 218
Although Gault dealt with juvenile delinquency matters, the same
underlying policy considerations demand similar protections for children
in immigration proceedings. The Perez-Funez court noted that in the
voluntary departure context, children are in an "inherently coercive" and
"stressful situation in which they are forced to make critical decisions"
while dealing with "interrogators [who] are foreign and authoritarian"
and attempting to navigate a complex body of law in a frightening and
unfamiliar country.2 19 In both delinquency and removal proceedings,
committee ever since.
213. Although all aliens in removal proceedings are permitted to have counsel, they
do not have a right to counsel at the government's expense. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)
(2003) (stating that an alien's rights in removal proceedings shall include "the privilege
of being represented, at no expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien's choosing
who is authorized to practice in such proceedings"); see also Women's Commission,
supra note 2, at 6.
214. In addition to the potential loss of liberty through detention or deportation from
the United States, the absence of counsel in immigration proceedings for these children is
inconsistent with how children are treated in a variety of other legal proceedings
throughout the country. For example, in "juvenile state court proceedings-ranging from
delinquency charges, to civil suits, to allegations of abuse and neglect-states such as
California, Kansas, Massachusetts, Ohio and Pennsylvania mandate the appointment of
counsel to ensure a fair and objective adjudication" for minors. Hearings, supra note 2
(statement of Andrew Morton).
215. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
216. 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (providing that children in delinquency proceedings are
entitled to basic procedural due process in delinquency proceedings including
appointment of counsel where the child's liberty is at stake).
217. Gault, 387 U.S. at 36. This need is even more pressing for unaccompanied alien
minors who often have no adults to speak for them or to guide them, who have minimal if
any proficiency in English and who cannot realistically be expected to understand the
twisting corridors of immigration law.
218. Id.
219. Perez-Funez v. INS, 619 F. Supp. 656, 662 (C.D. Cal. 1985). There is nothing to
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children are pitted against the state. In both types of proceedings,
children face the possibility of detention for extended periods of time,
and if not detention, long-term restrictions on their liberty interests.
220
Both removal and delinquency hearings are quasi-judicial, are overseen
by an arbiter, and allow for the introduction of evidence and the
presentation and cross-examination of witnesses.22' Children must have
counsel to satisfy constitutional due process where their liberty is at
risk.222 The reality is that unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in the
U.S. generally "lack even the most basic English skills," and do not
understand the "complex legal provisions that govern the standards of
detention and various forms of substantive immigration relief., 223  The
only way to ensure that these juveniles have meaningful notice and an
opportunity to be heard is if they are represented by counsel.
This constitutional mandate, however, is not the only reason
children need counsel. The appointment of counsel also ensures that
children: (1) are not detained unreasonably; (2) pursue appropriate forms
of relief, and (3) have a meaningful chance to gain that relief .224
Evidence suggests that represented asylees are "four to six times more
likely to win their asylum cases" than unrepresented aliens. 225 Given the
complexity of removal proceedings and the inherent inability of most
children to understand the nature or consequences of these proceedings,
children need counsel even more than adults. 6 Yet, less than half of
suggest that the later stages of immigration proceedings become less coercive or
adversarial.
220. Children in removal proceedings may be placed in foster care or some other
form of state custody. See supra notes 167-177 and accompanying text. Children in
delinquency proceedings may, among other things, be detained in juvenile facilities,
placed in treatment programs, or placed on probation. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 40-42
(discussing consequences facing children adjudicated delinquent and the need for
procedural protections).
221. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b) (2003) (stating that in removal proceedings the immigration
judge "shall administer oaths, receive evidence, and interrogate, examine, and cross-
examine the alien and any witnesses").
222. See Gault, 387 U.S. at 41; see also Hearings, supra note 2 (statement of Andrew
Morton) (stating that immigration proceedings carry with them the potential for "life-
altering decisions," including detention and deportation).
223. Hearings, supra note 2 (statement of Andrew Morton).
224. See Hearings, supra note 2 (statement of Andrew Morton) (noting that "apart
from the unassailable need for counsel when navigating the various forms of potential
substantive immigration relief, the presence of an attorney is critical to secure rigid
adherence with the laws and regulations that govern a detained juvenile's conditions of
confinement"). With regard to detention conditions, Human Rights Watch argues that
one of the reasons that detention conditions continue to violate domestic and international
standards is that alien children have no right to counsel, therefore, they have no one who
can challenge either the detention itself or the conditions of confinement. See SLIPPING
THROUGH, supra note 22, at 3.
225. Women's Commission, supra note 2, at 6 (internal citation omitted).
226. Id. For example, the federal regulations require that any juvenile apprehended
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alien children detained by the INS/BCIS have counsel.227 The absence of
appropriate representation not only violates due process, it also decreases
the likelihood that children will apply for all the forms of relief available
to them or that they will receive the relief for which they are eligible.
228
Thus, either Congress or the courts must explicitly mandate that
unaccompanied children in immigration proceedings receive the
assistance of counsel.
Second, children in immigration proceedings must be provided with
guardians ad litem.229  Guardians are necessary in order to fulfill the
government's statutory charge to take the interests of each alien child
into account when making placement decisions.23°  Prior to the
enactment of the HSA, critics argued that the INS was incapable of
making best interest determinations because it held the dual role of both
prosecutor and caretaker for unaccompanied children. 23' Although some
must be given a Form 1-770, Notice of Rights and Disposition. 8 C.F.R. § 236.3(h)
(2003). If the child cannot understand the form, or is under the age of fourteen, the notice
must be read to the child in a language that he or she understands. 8 C.F.R. § 236.3(h)
(2003). However, the regulation fails to ensure that the child actually understands the
form or the immigration consequences inherent in any decision he or she makes. Indeed,
the government could comply with the regulation by reading the form to a seven year old
in her native tongue, and yet, the child still would likely not understand what is
happening to her. This is just one example of why counsel is so vital for children
apprehended by immigration authorities.
227. Women's Commission, supra note 2, at 6.
228. For example, in the J visa context, an attorney is vital, not only because counsel
must understand federal immigration law in order to recognize that a child might be
eligible for the visa, but also because the visa process requires the attorney to "be familiar
with the state law requirements for a finding.of abuse, neglect or abandonment." Yale-
Loehr & Hoashi-Erhardt, supra note 134, at 660.
229. Children in other areas of U.S. law are regularly provided with guardians. See
Protecting the Rights, supra note 110, at 10.
230. 6 U.S.C. § 279(b)(l)(B) (2003) (requiring that the "interests of the child are
considered in decisions and actions relating to the care and custody of an unaccompanied
alien child").
231. See Women's Commission, supra note 2, at 2 (noting that the INS is balancing
two irreconcilable and competing functions. It is charged with providing custodial care
to unaccompanied children at the same time that it is acting as the prosecutor arguing in
favor of the child's removal from the United States. As a result, the INS is presented
with an inherent conflict of interest, under which it is simultaneously acting as service
provider and law enforcement agency. This conflict ultimately clogs the system with
inefficiencies and inequities and threatens the best interests of the children in question.
Moreover, the situation is exacerbated by the fact that the INS lacks the requisite child
welfare expertise to provide appropriate child care to children in its custody); Hearings,
supra note 2 (statement of Andrew Morton) (expressing surprise that the INS has the
responsibility to assume legal custody of unaccompanied alien children with the mandate
to care for them, while at the same time working to secure their deportation). Mr. Morton
also asserts that "we would not stand for a system where the district attorney serves as a
public defender, or where an arresting officer is appointed guardian ad litem for a
juvenile." Hearings, supra note 2. Yet, that is precisely what has traditionally been done
in immigration matters.
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of the concern over the government's dual role has been alleviated since
the passage of the HSA and the creation of a new office to handle
juvenile issues, it is by no means certain that the government is not
biased when dealing with these children. At the end of the day, the
government must balance fiscal, political, and bureaucratic concerns
when making placement decisions.232 Guardians represent only the
needs of the individual child because that is their only charge. Thus,
only guardians can determine, without bias, the best interests of a child.
Unaccompanied minors deserve that level of attention to ensure that their
needs are properly met, and the government needs guardians who are in
the best position to unearth information in order to comply with
congressional mandates.
An argument can be made that counsel can or should serve as both
legal advisor and guardian. However, I believe that it is only by keeping
these two roles separate that we truly protect children's rights and
interests. Attorneys are trained and equipped to address complex legal
immigration issues; their skills are invaluable. But children may be wary
of attorneys whom they view as part of the immigration system.
2 33
Guardians, on the other hand, are trained to elicit children's trust and to
protect their best interests. Thus, guardians are better equipped to
evaluate children's needs, explain their stories to the BCIS and
immigration judges, and, by standing apart from the formalities of
immigration proceedings, elicit from children what has actually
happened to them. This enables guardians not only to determine what is
in the best interest of the child, but also to provide immigration and law
enforcement officers, counsel, and judges with accurate information to
improve the quality of immigration hearings.234  Guardians are
particularly important for young children who may not be able to express
their wishes or who may be too young to truly understand the
232. See 6 U.S.C. § 279 (2003) (requiring that the ORR not only consider the interest
of children in making placement determinations, but also implement general policies,
oversee "infrastructure and personnel," identify sufficient placements for children in its
charge, collect and publish data, conduct investigations and inspections and coordinate
with other federal offices and agencies).
233. See Protecting the Rights, supra note 110, at 11 (discussing two asylum cases in
which guardians were able to develop trusting relationships with child applicants and
became the only persons involved who truly understood the child's past history and
current best interests). Guardians are best equipped and often better trained than
attorneys to devote the time it takes to appropriately ascertain a child's developmental
status, experiences, and culture with the sensitivity necessary to appropriately interview
children of different genders with different histories of abuse and neglect. See id. at 11
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consequences of those wishes.235  The INS Asylum Guidelines already
recognize the value of, and need for, trusted adults in the asylum context,
even though those guidelines do not require the appointment of
guardians.2 36 It is time for Congress and the courts to build upon the
Guidelines and require guardians for all unaccompanied alien children in
all immigration matters.
Third, detention conditions for children held pending their removal
proceedings must be improved. As noted in Part V.B, recent
investigations indicate that detention conditions for juveniles fall far
short of the standards mandated by the courts in the Flores settlement.
The Office of the Inspector General ("OIG"), Human Rights Watch, and
the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children have each
separately investigated and assessed detention conditions for
unaccompanied juvenile minors and, without exception, have found
grave departures from the standards articulated in the Flores agreement.
The Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children noted, in
August 2001, that: "[R]elease and placement decisions for children have
frequently remained ad hoc, arbitrary, and inconsistent, with little heed
given to what is in the best interests of each child. 2 37  In September
2001, OIG reported that, although the INS had made progress in
implementing the Flores agreement, OIG continued to find ongoing
"deficiencies in the handling of juveniles ... that could have potentially
serious consequences" for their well-being.238 Specifically, OIG found
235. Unaccompanied minors range in age from older adolescents to fifteen months.
Castro et al., supra note 209, at 14 (remarks by Andrew Morton) (noting that the
unaccompanied alien juvenile population ranges in age from "males in their late teens
who have crossed the Southern border all the way down to some very young children
who come to this country in very troubling ways-smuggled in, trafficked in-as young
as ten years old, eight years old, six years old. . . [to children] as young as fifteen months
of age who appear before the INS for a removal hearing. And they are not entitled to a
lawyer; they are not entitled to a guardian ad litem"). As Chief Immigration Judge
Michael Creppy noted, "where a juvenile does not have the capacity to make informed
decisions on his or her own behalf, I believe that the Immigration Court process would be
aided by the presence of an independent adult who can make informed
recommendations." Hearings, supra note 2 (statement of Michael Creppy, Chief
Immigration Judge).
236. See supra note 107 and accompanying text (discussing the role of "trusted
adults" in asylum determinations).
237. Women's Commission, supra note 2, at 10 (also detailing specific unacceptable
conditions of confinement in secure facilities).
238. OIG Report, Unaccompanied Juveniles in INS Custody, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/inspection/INS/0109/chapterl .htm#background (Sept. 28,
2001). The OIG report was designed to assess whether the INS was:
[1] Ensuring segregation of non-delinquent juveniles from delinquent juveniles
in custody.
[2] Monitoring juveniles in custody and juvenile detention facilities.
[3] Providing appropriate treatment and services to juveniles in custody.
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that the INS failed to segregate non-delinquent alien juveniles from
juvenile offenders, failed to document transportation conditions, failed to
provide escorts for juveniles traveling on commercial airplanes, and
continued to use restraints on non-delinquent alien juveniles during
transports. 239 Human Rights Watch noted that the INS has demonstrated
a consistent "combination of neglect and bad faith in dealing with the
issue of children in detention" and characterized detention conditions as
"inadequate."
240
In addition to domestic considerations, detention conditions also
raise concerns about the United States' compliance with international
standards for the treatment of unaccompanied alien minors. Although
international law is not the focus of this article, commentators have
strongly criticized U.S. treatment of unaccompanied child aliens as
violating the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child ("CRC"). 241 One
commentator noted that "there is hardly an article of the [CRC] that is
not violated by current INS practices in detaining children., 242 Thus, the
government's treatment of unaccompanied children is a gross violation
[4] Facilitating timely, appropriate, and least-restrictive placement ofjuveniles.
[5] Providing appropriate levels of operational and administrative support for
the Juvenile Program.
[6] Ensuring the shelter care facilities operated within their proper roles and
responsibilities.
[7] Planning and acquiring the appropriate number and types of juvenile bed-
spaces.
[8] Providing appropriate INS managerial oversight at all levels.
[9] Training INS employees in the requirements of the Juvenile Program.
[I 0]Limiting the time juveniles remained in custody to the extent possible.
[11]Initiating timely immigration hearings for juveniles and ensuring the
appearance of the juveniles at the hearings.
Id.
239. Id. (noting also that the report included twenty-eight recommendations to rectify
the INS failures).
240. SLIPPING THROUGH, supra note 22, at 3 (also noting that the INS is violating
children's rights "in flagrant disregard of U.S. laws and international human rights
standards").
241. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 28 I.L.M.
1448 [hereinafter CRC]. For commentary on the CRC, see Ehrenreich, supra note 25, at
283 and SLIPPING THROUGH, supra note 22, at 5. The United States has signed, but not
ratified the treaty, however the treaty entered into force on September 2, 1990. CRC,
supra note 241, at 1448.
242. Ehrenreich, supra note 25, at 283 (noting that the violations include violations of
the spirit and the letter of the CRC). Ehrenreich notes that conditions facing children in
INS detention violate Articles 8 (right to preserve identity and family relations), 9 (right
of a child not to be separated from parents against his will), 10 (right to stay in contact
with parents, prompt reunification), 12 (right to express views and be heard in
proceedings), 16 (right not to be detained arbitrarily), 20 (children deprived of family get
special protection from the state), 22 (refugee children get special protection), 28 (right to
an education), 30 (right to culture, religion, and language), and 37 (no arbitrary detention
of children). Id. at 283-84.
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of both its domestic responsibilities under the Flores settlement and its
obligations under international norms.243 The BCIS must increase
compliance with, and monitoring of, detention conditions to ensure that
juveniles are only detained when absolutely necessary and that detention
conditions comport with the Flores agreement.
Fourth, in addition to the constitutional, statutory, and case law
mandates compelling changes to the current system, common sense and
logic requires that the federal government make clear who has
responsibility for and oversight of unaccompanied juvenile minors. The
HSA moved responsibility for all matters pertaining to unaccompanied
juvenile aliens to the Office of Refugee Resettlement ("ORR") in the
Department of Health and Human Services.244 General responsibility for
juvenile aliens previously resided in the Office of Juvenile Affairs
("OJA") within INS.24 5 It is not entirely clear how ORR and OJA
interact, or if OJA still exists. 246 While the two agencies could work
together to seamlessly provide for alien children's needs, the more likely
result is that children will slip through the cracks.247 The mere existence
243. Id. at 284 (noting that the INS has "a rather thorough set of regulations for
dealing with unaccompanied minors" and those regulations, coupled with the Flores
consent decree provide protection for these children). Ehrenreich and her colleagues, in a
series of interviews with INS official and employees, found that both the INS and its
"contracting agencies" ignore the orders and regulations either because they were not
aware of the rules or, unfortunately, because "some INS officials simply do not care." Id.
Although Ehrenreich was careful to note that she interviewed many "conscientious and
caring INS employees" she also was troubled by "an even greater number who showed a
disturbing ignorance of the legal regulations, and an even more disturbing lack of concern
for the children under their control." Id.
244. 6 U.S.C. § 279 (2003). The Department of Health and Human Services has
placed ORR within the Administration for Children and Families ("ACF"). See
Statement of Organization, Functions, and Delegations of Authority, 68 Fed. Reg. 11566
(Mar. 11, 2003).
245. The INS established the Office of Juvenile Affairs in 2002 to "identify[] and
address[] the concerns ofjuveniles in INS custody." U.S. Dep't of Justice, Immigration
& Naturalization Service, Fact Sheet: INS' Office of Juvenile Affairs, available at
http://www.ins.usdoj.gov (last visited Sept. 12, 2004) (on file with author) (discussing the
roles and responsibilities of the office) [hereinafter "INS Fact Sheet']; see also BCIS,
INS Announces First Major Structural Changes in Restructuring, available at
http://www.immigration.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/newsrels/restruct-nr.htm (Apr. 17,
2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter "INS Press Release"]; 8 C.F.R. § 236.3(c), (e), ()
(2003) (discussing the role of the Office of Juvenile Affairs). The government
inconsistently identifies the children for whom OJA is responsible. Compare 8 C.F.R.
§ 236 (b)(iii), (e) and INS Fact Sheet, supra note 245 with INS Press Release, supra note
245.
246. Although § 279 indicates that it transfers "functions under the immigration laws
of the United States with respect to the care of unaccompanied alien children that were
vested by statute in, or performed by, the Commissioner of Immigration and
Naturalization," the language does not indicate what happens to functions and
responsibilities for other alien children.
247. This concern is only heightened by the knowledge that ORR's "unaccompanied
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of these two agencies evidences a lack of coordination on the part of the
government in terms of long-term planning for children's needs2 48 and
longstanding disconnects between agencies and offices within the
INS/BCIS "carr[y] particularly troubling consequences for children" who
already suffer from the government's unwillingness to craft coherent
policies and to monitor detention conditions.249
Even if ORR is now the only office responsible for alien children's
needs, there are disturbing gaps in its current mandate. First, under the
HSA, ORR is required to develop "a plan to be submitted to Congress on
how to ensure that qualified and independent legal counsel is timely
appointed to represent the interests" of each unaccompanied alien child
"consistent with the law regarding appointment of counsel that is in
effect on" November 25, 2002.250 The statutory language does not
provide, however, a timeline for the submission of the plan, nor does it
require that these children actually be appointed counsel. In fact, the law
regarding counsel for unaccompanied minors in effect on November 25,
2002 did not guarantee counsel to children; rather, it allowed children to
251hire counsel at their own expense. Second, while ORR is now
mandated to "compil[e], updat[e], and publish[] at least annually a state-
by-state list of professionals or other entities to provide guardian and
attorney representation services for unaccompanied alien children,"
nothing in the statute either requires that list be given to children, or that
unaccompanied minors be provided with either attorneys or guardians.252
In addition, although the ORR is required to take the best interests of the
child into account regarding the "care and custody" of unaccompanied
minors program is limited to 14 designated programs able to provide refugee-appropriate
child welfare services. These specialized services are provided" in Boston, Tacoma and
Seattle, Fargo, Philadelphia, Rochester and Syracuse, Jackson, Richmond, Newark,
Washington, D.C., Lansing and Grand Rapids and Phoenix. U.S. Dep't of Health &
Human Services, Administration of Children & Families, State Letter #02-07, available
at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/orr/policy/s 102-07.htm (n.d.) (on file with author).
248. Advocacy groups, long criticizing the long-standing INS' decentralization, note
that the lack of coordination between its three regions and thirty-three districts has led to
"a lack of accountability, and inconsistent practices with regard to children from district
to district and region to region." Women's Commission, supra note 2, at 12; see also
Hearings, supra note 2 (statement of Julianne Duncan) (noting that, in the past two
decades, the Department of Justice has shifted responsibility for unaccompanied juvenile
aliens numerous times, including shifts in 1996, 2000, and 2002). Arguably, this lack of
accountability will only increase if the decentralization now encompasses not only a
disconnect between regions and districts, but also between federal offices whose mandate
it is to deal with different groups of alien children.
249. Women's Commission, supra note 2, at 11.
250. 6 U.S.C. § 279(b)(1)(A) (2004).
251. See supra note 213.
252. 6 U.S.C. § 279(b)(1)(I) (2004). Additionally, nothing in the law indicates to
whom the list is to be given, or that the list be translated for or given to children in need
of those services.
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alien children, no provision exists to clarify how those decisions are
made.253  Ultimately, a lack of clarity permeates all aspects of
immigration law as it pertains to unaccompanied alien children.
Children find themselves in an adversarial process in which the other
side knows and makes all the rules, has all the power, and frequently
exercises that power to detain and deport children of all ages.
VII. Conclusion
In short, unaccompanied alien children face enough hurdles in their
lives without the additional trauma of lengthy detentions or coerced
departures from the United States. Unaccompanied minors are
extraordinarily vulnerable and have the right to protection and support,
not hasty and brutal treatment at the hands of the federal government. As
one commentator has noted, "[c]hildren comprise one third of the annual
immigration total in this country-they are not a miniscule special
interest group or an outlier population. We should unabashedly demand
that children's perspectives inform larger discussion of immigration law
and policy. ' '254 Current U.S. policies, while a step in the right direction,
still fail to adequately and appropriately protect children. The United
States must comply with the Constitution, federal statutes, and judicial
decisions, and implement far greater safeguards for those who reach its
shores without adults to look out for their interests.
253. 6 U.S.C. § 279(b)(1)(B) (2004).
254. Thronson, supra note 32, at 1015.
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